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Vincent R. Johnson 
The Informed Consent Doctrine in Legal Malpractice Law 
Abstract.  The doctrine of informed consent is now deeply embedded into 
the law of legal ethics.  In legal malpractice litigation, the doctrine holds that a 
lawyer has a duty to disclose to a client material information about the risks and 
alternatives associated with a course of action.  A lawyer who fails to make such 
required disclosures and fails to obtain informed consent is negligent, regardless 
of whether the lawyer otherwise exercises care in representing a client.  If such 
negligent nondisclosures cause damages, the lawyer can be held accountable for 
the client’s losses. 
Shifting the focus of a legal malpractice action from garden-variety 
negligence (such as ignorance of the law, late filing of a complaint, or failure to 
safeguard client funds or data) to a lack of informed consent can potentially 
transform a losing case into a winner.  Among other things, the doctrine has 
the potential to simplify and clarify the plaintiff’s argument, which may be 
especially useful if the case is tried to a jury.  The informed consent doctrine 
also makes sense as a matter of public policy, because clients have a right to 
control important matters related to their representation.   
This Article explores the informed consent doctrine in legal malpractice law.  
It discusses the rise of the informed consent doctrine in medical malpractice 
law and traces the transplantation of the language and principles of informed 
consent, first, into the law of lawyer discipline, and then into the law of lawyer 
civil liability.  The Article explores what the relevant legal malpractice case law 




addresses certain pivotal issues in the operation of the informed consent 
doctrine in claims by clients against lawyers, including the nature of lawyer 
disclosure obligations, the limits imposed by the scope of the representation, 
the role of expert testimony, and the standard for proving factual causation. 
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I.    INTRODUCTION
There are many ways for a plaintiff to lose a legal malpractice case, even 
if the defendant-lawyer grievously erred.  A claim may fail due to lack of 
privity;1 or expert testimony;2 or insufficient evidence of factual causation3 
or damages;4 or due to defenses based on untimely filing5 or unlawful 
conduct;6 or for many other reasons.7  
Representing a plaintiff asserting a legal malpractice claim is not for the 
timid or the unprepared.  Indeed, the doctrinal and procedural obstacles to 
recovery facing victims of lawyer negligence are so numerous and so potent, 
one might suspect the deck is stacked against them.8 
In contrast, the rules that make it easier for legal malpractice plaintiffs to 
recover are few and far between.  In rare cases, plaintiffs do not need to 
adduce expert testimony;9 or the burden of proof on causation is shifted to 
the defendant;10 or a business transaction between a lawyer and client is 
 
1. See Susan Saab Fortney & Vincent R. Johnson, Legal Malpractice § 5-4.1(a),  
in LEGAL ETHICS, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 810, 810–11  
(2018) [hereinafter Fortney & Johnson, Legal Malpractice] (discussing “[t]he [p]rivity [o]bstacle”). 
2. See id. § 5-2.2(f)(1), at 752–53 (discussing the necessity of expert testimony “to [e]stablish the 
[s]tandard of [c]are”). 
3. See id. § 5-2.3(a), at 772 (discussing factual causation). 
4. See id. § 5-5.1, at 851–53 (discussing compensatory damages). 
5. See id. § 5-6.4(a), at 879 (discussing malpractice statutes of limitations). 
6. See id. § 5-6.2(c), at 870–74 (discussing unlawful conduct); see also Vincent R. Johnson,  
The Unlawful Conduct Defense in Legal Malpractice, 77 UMKC L. REV. 43, 45–46 (2008) (explaining modern 
legal malpractice law currently recognizes the outlaw doctrine in various forms). 
7. See, e.g., Vincent R. Johnson, Causation and “Legal Certainty” in Legal Malpractice Law, 
8 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 374, 399–400 (2018) (citations omitted) (“Suits by 
clients may flounder because the matter in question fell outside the scope of the representation, 
involved a permissible exercise of lawyer discretion, or resulted in nothing more than the client’s ‘loss 
of chance’ to secure a more favorable result.”). 
8. Cf. Susan Saab Fortney, A Tort in Search of a Remedy: Prying Open the Courthouse Doors for Legal 
Malpractice Victims, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2033, 2056 (2017) (“[I]t is time to reexamine whether our 
civil liability regime provides meaningful remedies to numerous consumers injured by attorney 
misconduct.”); Benjamin H. Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interests of the Legal Profession?, 
59 ALA. L. REV. 453, 453 (2008) (“[M]any legal outcomes can be explained, and future cases predicted, 
by asking a very simple question: is there a plausible legal result in this case that will significantly affect 
the interests of the legal profession (positively or negatively)?  If so, the case will be decided in the way 
that offers the best result for the legal profession.”). 
9. Fortney & Johnson, Legal Malpractice, supra note 1, § 5-2.2(f)(2), at 753 (discussing the 
exception to the expert testimony requirement for obvious negligence). 
10. Id. § 5-2.3(a)(5), at 780 (discussing “[s]hifting the [b]urden of [p]roof on [c]ausation”); 
Jeffrie D. Boysen, Shifting the Burden of Proof on Causation in Legal Malpractice Actions, 1 ST. MARY’S J. 
LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 308, 323–24 (2011) (discussing burden shifting in Louisiana). 
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presumed to have been unfair.11  In the usual case, however, a legal 
malpractice plaintiff faces obstacle after obstacle. 
Against this sobering backdrop reflecting the realities of legal malpractice 
litigation,12 an important doctrine has emerged that, in a broad range of 
cases spanning more than forty years,13 makes it easier for legal malpractice 
plaintiffs to recover damages by way of court judgments and private 
settlements.  The doctrine is the rule of informed consent.  Now deeply 
embedded into the law of legal ethics,14 the doctrine holds a lawyer has a 
duty to disclose material information about the risks and alternatives 
associated with a course of action, allowing the client to make informed 
decisions related to their representation.15  Thus, in Sierra Fria Corp. v. 
Donald J. Evans P.C.,16 the First Circuit wrote: 
 
11. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE L. GOVERNING LAWS. § 126 cmt. e (AM. L. INST. 
2000) (“Unintended overreaching is a possibility in transactions involving lawyers and their clients.  
Accordingly a lawyer must overcome a presumption that overreaching occurred by demonstrating the 
fairness of the transaction.”). 
12. See generally Vincent R. Johnson, Legal Malpractice Claims: What the Data Indicate, 9 ST. MARY’S 
J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 138, 145 (2018) (reviewing HERBERT M. KRITZER & NEIL 
VIDMAR, WHEN LAWYERS SCREW UP: IMPROVING ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE 
VICTIMS (2018)) [hereinafter Johnson, Legal Malpractice Claims] (citations omitted) (“Only a small 
fraction of LPL [lawyer professional liability] claims is brought by lawyers with substantial expertise in 
this area[;] . . .  [A] large percentage of LPL claims do[] not result in compensation being paid[.]” 
(quoting Kritzer & Vidmar, supra, at 12, 62) (second, third, and fourth alterations in the original)). 
13. See Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 
128 U. PA. L. REV. 41, 67 (1979) (citations omitted) (“Hornbook agency law states that the agent has 
a duty to disclose all material information to his client.”); id. at 73 (“[A] lawyer should be affirmatively 
required to obtain informed consent when client values or lawyer conflicts of interest are involved.”).  
Professor Martyn stated long ago: 
Clients have successfully alleged in malpractice suits, or as grounds for other relief, failure to 
disclose information material to the client’s decision, failure to disclose conflicts of interest, and 
failure to disclose an attorney’s opinion regarding the merits of a case.  By creating an affirmative 
duty to inform the client, these decisions permit the client to make an informed choice about the 
next course of action. 
Susan R. Martyn, Informed Consent in the Practice of Law, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 307, 330 (1980). 
14. Fortney & Johnson, Legal Malpractice, supra note 1, § 5-2.2(n), at 769–70. 
15. See id. (describing the meaning of “informed consent”); cf. Rice v. Downs, 203 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
555, 569–70 (Cal. Ct. App. June 28, 2016) (holding a legal malpractice action based on failure to disclose 
information and obtain informed consent with respect to actual and potential conflicts was not barred 
by an arbitration clause); Lewellen v. Phillips, No. C062277, 2010 WL 4851362, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Nov. 30, 2010) (finding evidence negated the plaintiff’s allegations that her lawyer “badgered her into 
accepting the settlement agreement and failed to obtain her informed consent before it was executed”). 
16. Sierra Fria Corp. v. Donald J. Evans, P.C.,127 F.3d 175 (1st Cir. 1997). 
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[W]hen a client seeks advice from an attorney, the attorney owes the client “a 
duty of full and fair disclosure of facts material to the client’s interests.”  This 
means that the attorney must advise the client of any significant legal risks 
involved in a contemplated transaction, and must do so in terms sufficiently 
plain to permit the client to assess both the risks and their potential impact on 
his situation.17 
A lawyer who fails to make such required disclosures and obtain informed 
consent is negligent, regardless of whether the lawyer otherwise exercises 
care in representing a client.18  If the negligent nondisclosures cause 
damages, the lawyer can be held accountable for the client’s losses.19   
There is a divergence of authority as to whether causation of damages is 
assessed by use of a subjective test, an objective test, or some combination 
thereof.  That issue is discussed in detail near the end of this Article in 
Part V.D.  In other parts of this Article, such as quoted materials or 
discussions referencing the decisions or opinions of other authorities, 
readers should expect to encounter varying tests for proving whether a 
nondisclosure of material information caused damages.  
The Illinois Appellate Court explained the doctrine of informed consent 
in the following terms: 
[A]n attorney’s liability for failing to advise a client of the foreseeable risks 
attendant to a given course of legal action is not predicated upon the 
impropriety of the recommended course of action; rather, it is predicated 
upon the client’s exposure to a risk that the client did not knowingly and 
voluntarily assume.  Consequently, to establish the element of proximate 
cause, it is necessary for the client to both plead and prove that had the 
 
17. Id. at 179–80 (citation omitted). 
18. Cf. Metrick v. Chatz, 639 N.E.2d 198, 653–54 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (“If a client suffers damage 
because of the happening of a foreseeable risk of which he or she was not informed, the attorney may 
be liable.  In such a case, the attorney's liability is not predicated upon the impropriety of the chosen 
course of action, but rather upon the failure to inform the client sufficiently to enable him or her to 
voluntarily accept the risk attendant thereto.”).  But see Friedman v. Kahn, No. 1-12-0881, 2013 WL 
6858452, at *12 (Ill. App. Ct. Dec. 27, 2013) (affirming, in relevant part, a judgment adverse to the 
client in a legal malpractice action based on lack of informed consent where the trial court refused to 
instruct the jury that “[i]f a lawyer fails to advise his clients regarding the foreseeable risk of a course 
of action he advises the client to take, the lawyer is negligent regardless of the propriety of the course 
of action the lawyer recommends”). 
19. Cf. Frazee v. Proskauer Rose LLP, No. B254569, 2016 WL 6236400, at *1–2 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Oct. 25, 2016) (affirming dismissal of legal malpractice claims based on failure to obtain informed 
consent to the terms of a settlement because plaintiff failed to prove proximate causation of damages). 
  
368 ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS [Vol. 11:362 
undisclosed risk been known, he or she would not have accepted the risk and 
consented to the recommended course of action.20 
A jury instruction used in the state of Washington captures the key 
features of the legal malpractice informed consent doctrine in the following 
terms: 
A lawyer has a duty to inform a client of all material facts, including risks and 
alternatives, which a reasonably prudent client would need to make an 
informed decision on whether to consent to or reject a proposed course of 
action.  A material fact is one to which a reasonably prudent person in a 
position of a client would attach significan[ce] in deciding whether or not to 
follow the proposed course of action. 
A lawyer’s duty to properly advise and counsel the lawyer’s client in 
accordance with the applicable standard of care cannot be delegated to 
another person or entity.21 
Shifting the focus of a legal malpractice action from garden-variety 
negligence (e.g., ignorance of the law,22 late filing of a complaint,23 or 
 
20. Metrick, 639 N.E.2d at 202. 
21. Edleman v. Russell, No. 65668-6-I, 2012 WL 1501064, at *2–3 (refusing to review a 
challenge to the jury instruction that was not adequately preserved).  The last sentence of the instruction 
presumably means not that the duty cannot be delegated, but rather that, if the duty is delegated and 
misperformed, the lawyer who delegated the duty is responsible for the misperformance.  
“[N]ondelegable duty arguments have been raised, and have sometimes succeeded, in legal malpractice 
cases . . . .”  Vincent R. Johnson & Stephen C. Loomis, Malpractice Liability Related to Foreign Outsourcing 
of Legal Services, 2 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 262, 307–08 (2012) (footnotes 
omitted); see also Fortney & Johnson, Legal Malpractice, supra note 1, § 5-7.3(f), at 925 (discussing 
nondelegable duties); Kleeman v. Rheingold, 614 N.E.2d 712, 713–14, 718 (N.Y. 1993) (holding a law 
firm had a nondelegable duty to its client to assure proper service of legal process); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE L. GOVERNING LAWS. § 122 cmt. c(i) (AM. L. INST. 2000) (“When several lawyers 
represent the same client, responsibility to make disclosure and obtain informed consent may be 
delegated to one or more of the lawyers who appears reasonably capable of providing adequate 
information.”). 
22. According to a recent study, 15.90% of legal malpractice claims involve failure to know or 
properly apply the law.  STANDING COMM. ON LAWS.’ PRO. LIAB., 2020–2021, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 2016–2019, at 22 (2020) [hereinafter PROFILE OF LEGAL 
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS].  See generally Fortney & Johnson, Legal Malpractice, supra note 1, § 5-2.2(d)(1), 
at 748 (noting the duty of “[c]ompetence entails many things, including . . . knowledge” of the 
applicable law).   
23. About 10% of legal malpractice cases relate to failure to properly calendar deadlines (7.40%) 
or failure to react to calendared deadlines (2.54%).  PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS, supra 
note 22, at 22.  See generally Fortney & Johnson, Legal Malpractice, supra note 1, § 5-2.2(d)(3), at 749 
(stating the duty of diligence “requires timely attention to the client’s affairs”). 
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failure to safeguard client funds24 or data25) to a lack of informed consent 
can potentially transform a losing case into a winner.  Among other things, 
the doctrine has the potential to simplify and clarify the plaintiff’s argument, 
which may be especially useful if the case is tried to a jury.   
Essentially, what the plaintiff needs to prove in a case alleging lack of 
informed consent is that a certain fact was material26 and required to be 
disclosed, that it was known to the defendant-lawyer but not disclosed by 
the lawyer or otherwise known to the plaintiff, and that if the fact had been 
disclosed the plaintiff would have chosen a different course and achieved a 
more favorable result.27  These three factors—required disclosure, breach 
 
24. See generally Gregory C. Sisk, Duties to Effectively Represent the Client § 4-5.6, in LEGAL ETHICS, 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 273, 297–303 (2018) (discussing 
“The Duty to Safeguard Client Funds and Property”); see also Vincent R. Johnson, The Limited Duties of 
Lawyers to Protect the Funds and Property of Nonclients, 8 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 58, 
66 (2017) (“Any discussion of the duties of lawyers to protect the funds or property of third persons 
must undoubtedly begin with the text of Rule 1.15 of the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct.”). 
25. See Hiscox Ins. Co. v. Warden Grier, LLP, 474 F. Supp. 3d 1004, 1006 (W.D. Mo. 2020) 
(discussing claims against a law firm involving failure to protect data based on contract, implied 
contract, fiduciary duty, and negligence); Nell Gluckman & Christine Simmons, Cravath Admits Breach 
as Law Firm Hacks Go Public, AMLAW DAILY, Mar. 30, 2016, at 1 (describing an IT breach that occurred 
at two firms during the summer of 2015); see also Vincent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the 
Limits of Tort Liability, 57 S.C. L. REV. 255, 281 (2005) (footnotes omitted) (“In light of the fiduciary-
duty rules on confidentiality (and the related obligations requiring safekeeping of client property), a 
lawyer or law firm could not plausibly argue that there is no duty to safeguard computerized client data 
from intruders.”); Vincent R. Johnson, Credit-Monitoring Damages in Cybersecurity Tort Litigation, 19 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 113, 130–31 (2011) (discussing a case where “[t]he court ordered the responsible 
attorney to pay for five years of credit monitoring to protect the plaintiff from identity theft”). 
26. See Vincent R. Johnson, “Absolute and Perfect Candor” to Clients, 34 ST. MARY’S L.J. 737, 782 
(2003) (discussing “materiality” and stating “[c]ourts have repeatedly recognized that the fiduciary 
obligations of an attorney require disclosure of facts that are material to the representation”). 
27. In addressing the factual causation requirement in legal malpractice actions, the language of 
the courts varies, but the underlying ideas are often the same.  In Reppucci v. Nadeau, 238 A.3d 994, 999 
(Me. 2020), the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine simply stated that “a legal malpractice plaintiff must 
establish that he or she was deprived of a ‘more favorable result’ in the underlying case by proving 
what its outcome would have been had the attorney not been negligent.”  Similarly, in Gulfport  
OB-GYN, P.A. v. Dukes, Dukes, Keating & Faneca, P.A., 283 So. 3d 676, 679 (Miss. 2019), the Supreme 
Court of Mississippi made clear that showing there would have been a “[b]etter [d]eal” or “[n]o [d]eal” 
are ways of showing there would have been a more favorable result.  As the court explained: 
Causation in a negligence-based legal-malpractice claim for a breach of the duty of care requires 
proof that, but for the attorney’s negligence, a more favorable result would have been obtained.  
Thus, when the complaint is that the attorney should have proposed different or additional terms 
to a transaction, the malpractice plaintiff must show that such terms would have been accepted 
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of that duty, and a different course that would have achieved a better 
outcome—may be proved, to an important extent, based on the plaintiff’s 
own testimony.28  This tight focus tends to cut through the bewildering 
complexities that are common to legal malpractice litigation: a wide-ranging 
battle of experts, multitudinous documents, confusing layers of litigation, 
and a cast with too many actors and entities.29 
The informed consent doctrine also makes sense as a matter of public 
policy because clients have a right to control important matters related to 
their representation.30  As expressed by the Illinois Appellate Court: 
The purpose of such a rule is to enable the client to make an informed decision 
as to whether the foreseeable risks of a proposed legal course of action are 
justified by its potential benefits when compared to other alternative courses 
of action.31  
How can a lawyer defending a negligence action claim to have acted 
reasonably if the lawyer failed to disclose material risks and alternatives 
related to the representation?  If the negligent nondisclosure causes harm, 
 
by the other party or that the client would not have entered into the deal and would have been 
better off for doing so. 
Id. at 681. 
28. Cf. Tye v. Beausay, 156 N.E.3d 331, 343 (Ohio Ct. App. 2020) (“[I]n situations involving 
informed consent, a ‘patient’s hindsight’ (i.e., testimony as to her hypothetical response to the 
undisclosed information), while relevant, is not determinative.” (quoting Nickell v. Gonzalez, 
477 N.E.2d 1145, 1149 (Ohio 1985))); Conklin v. Hannoch Weisman, 678 A.2d 1060, 1070 (N.J. 1996) 
(“[A] legal malpractice claimant’s testimony concerning whether he or she would have entered into a 
transaction, if adequately informed of its risks, is [not] irrelevant.  A client’s attitude about risk is a part 
of that client and is a component of proximate cause.”). 
29. See Fortney & Johnson, Legal Malpractice, supra note 1, § 5-2.3(a)(2)(A), at 777 (discussing 
factual complexity in legal malpractice litigation). 
30. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE L. GOVERNING LAWS. § 22(1) (AM. L. INST. 2000) 
(“[T]he following and comparable decisions are reserved to the client except when the client has validly 
authorized the lawyer to make the particular decision: whether and on what terms to settle a claim; 
how a criminal defendant should plead; whether a criminal defendant should waive jury trial; whether 
a criminal defendant should testify; and whether to appeal in a civil proceeding or criminal 
prosecution.”); see also Vincent R. Johnson, Solicitation of Law Firm Clients by Departing Partners and 
Associates: Tort, Fiduciary, and Disciplinary Liability, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 81 (1988) (footnote omitted) 
(“Clients alone have the right to decide who shall represent them.  They cannot exercise such rights 
intelligently if they are deprived of relevant information.”); cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 1.17 cmt. 9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“All elements of client autonomy, including the client’s absolute 
right to discharge a lawyer and transfer the representation to another, survive the sale of the practice 
or area of practice.”). 
31. Metrick v. Chatz, 639 N.E.2d 198, 201 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). 
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imposing liability for proximately caused damages is fair.  “The ultimate test 
for any body of law addressing issues of professional liability is whether the 
law operates with a sufficient degree of fairness that aggrieved individuals 
are willing to resolve their disputes through legal channels, rather than by 
resorting to brute force.”32  The doctrine of informed consent helps ensure 
legal malpractice law measures up to this jurisprudential standard of fairness. 
This Article explores the informed consent doctrine in legal malpractice 
law.  Part II discusses the rise of the informed consent doctrine in medical 
malpractice law.  Part III traces the transplantation of the language and 
principles of informed consent into the law of lawyer discipline.33  Part IV 
explores what the relevant legal malpractice case law says about the 
obligation to obtain informed consent.  Part V addresses certain pivotal 
issues in the operation of the informed consent doctrine in claims by clients 
against lawyers, including the nature of lawyer disclosure obligations, the 
limits imposed by the scope of the representation, the role of expert 
testimony, and the standard for proving factual causation.  Part VI offers 
concluding thoughts. 
II.    INFORMED CONSENT IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW 
In medical malpractice law, the doctrine of informed consent, first 
recognized around 1960,34 is widely established today.35  In some 
jurisdictions, it requires not only disclosure of risks related to a course of 
 
32. Vincent R. Johnson, The Importance of Doctor Liability in Medical Malpractice Law: China Versus 
the United States, 10 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 2, 28 (2019). 
33. See Metrick, 639 N.E.2d at 201 (“It is the duty of every attorney to inform a client of the 
available options for alternative legal solutions, as well as to explain the foreseeable risks and benefits 
of each. . . .  This proposition is nothing more than an application of the long-standing rule pertinent 
to a cause of action for medical negligence premised upon a lack of informed consent.”). 
34. See Spiegel, supra note 13, at 44 (“Beginning about 1960, courts began to reexamine the 
consent doctrine.  They began looking beyond the explicit or implicit signal from patient to doctor to 
examine the content of the ‘bargaining process.’  They began asking whether the doctor had 
communicated sufficient information to the patient about the proposed treatment and possible 
alternatives.”). 
35. See Sam F. Halabi, Against Fiduciary Utopianism: The Regulation of Physician Conflicts of Interest and 
Standards of Care, 11 UC IRVINE L. REV. 433, 447 (2020) (footnotes omitted) (“Since its first official 
appearance in 1957, informed consent has been significantly expanded.  Now situated in medical 
negligence, a physician has a duty to disclose to a patient the material risks associated with a proposed 
procedure when a reasonable patient would need to hear that information to make an informed 
decision.”); see also Buu Nguyen v. IHC Med. Servs., 288 P.3d 1084, 1091–92 (Utah Ct. App. 2012) 
(holding it may be “appropriate to impose a duty on a hospital to obtain informed consent when 
unfamiliar equipment on loan to the hospital, as the hospital considers its possible purchase, is used 
outside of the normal course of the hospital’s established procedures”). 
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treatment,36 but also the potentially conflicting research and economic 
interests of the medical professional seeking to obtain consent.37 
The informed consent doctrine in medicine is rooted in a fundamental 
belief that “[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right 
to determine what shall be done with his [or her] own body[.]”38  “[T]he 
patient’s right of self-determination implies a right to important 
information . . . .”39  Under the doctrine, a physician has an obligation to 
disclose the material risks of, and relevant alternatives to, a proposed course 
of treatment.  “The gist of the informed consent claim is that the physician 
failed to provide information to the patient, usually about the risk of the 
proposed procedure or about safer alternatives.”40  The failure to make such 
disclosures and obtain patient consent before rendering treatment may be a 
 
36. See Caroline Lowry, Intersex in 2018: Evaluating the Limitations of Informed Consent in Medical 
Malpractice Claims as a Vehicle for Gender Justice, 52 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 321, 336 (2019) (“The 
common law duty of informed consent obligates doctors to disclose information pertaining to 
diagnosis, procedures, and the likely outcomes of procedures.”). 
37. In Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), the California Supreme Court 
wrote: 
Moore repeatedly alleges that Golde failed to disclose the extent of his research and economic 
interests in Moore’s cells before obtaining consent to the medical procedures by which the cells 
were extracted.  These allegations, in our view, state a cause of action against Golde for invading 
a legally protected interest of his patient.  This cause of action can properly be characterized either 
as the breach of a fiduciary duty to disclose facts material to the patient’s consent or, alternatively, 
as the performance of medical procedures without first having obtained the patient’s informed 
consent. 
Id. at 483 (footnote omitted). 
38. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (quoting Schloendorff v. Soc’y of 
N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)); see Brad Nokes et al., Difficult Discharges: Sending Patients Out 
Without Getting Into Trouble, 14 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 60, 81 (2020) (“Autonomy and self-
determination have long been pillars of informed consent.”); cf. Samuel D. Hodge, Jr. & Jack E. 
Hubbard, Covid-19: The Ethical and Legal Implications of Medical Rationing, 56 GONZ. L. REV. 159, 183 
(2021) (footnotes omitted) (“There may come a time when hospitals will have to make difficult 
decisions on how to ration ventilators.  Some say that ethical principles should be the guide for 
ventilator allocation based upon ‘respect for persons and their autonomy, beneficence . . . , and justice.’  
This first principle, deference and respect to patients and their autonomy, mandates doctors secure a 
person’s informed consent and honor any informed refusal.” (quoting Ventilator Document 
Workgroup, Ethical Considerations for Decision Making Regarding Allocation of Mechanical Ventilators During a 
Severe Influenza Pandemic or Other Public Health Emergency, CDC 10 (July 1, 2011), https://www.cdc. 
gov/about/advisory/pdf/VentDocument_Release.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ACH-C4E9])). 
39. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK ON TORTS 513 (2d ed. 2016). 
40. Id. at 495 (footnote omitted). 
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breach of the professional duties the physician owes to the patient.41  That 
breach will permit the patient to recover damages from the physician in a 
negligence action, even if the physician otherwise exercised care, provided 
the plaintiff proves that but for the nondisclosure the patient would have 
chosen a different course and thereby avoided the harm caused by the 
undisclosed risks.42  “Some courts require the physician to disclose all 
material information, while others say that what the physician must disclose 
is determined by medical custom, not by what is relevant to the patient’s 
decision-making.”43 
As summarized by the Ohio Court of Appeals: 
The tort of lack of informed consent, as established in Ohio, contains the 
following requirements:  
(a) The physician fails to disclose to the patient and discuss the material risks 
and dangers inherently and potentially involved with respect to the proposed 
therapy, if any;  
(b) the unrevealed risks and dangers which should have been disclosed by the 
physician actually materialize and are the proximate cause of the injury to 
the patient; and  
(c) a reasonable person in the position of the patient would have decided against 
the therapy had the material risks and dangers inherent and incidental to 
treatment been disclosed to him or her prior to the therapy.44 
A. Materiality 
With respect to materiality, it is normally “for the trier of fact to 
determine whether a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would have 
 
41. See Brodsky v. Osunkwo, No. L-2564-08, 2012 WL 1161598, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. Apr. 10, 2012) (reinstating an informed consent negligence claim against a doctor who failed to 
tell a sixteen-year-old male leukemia patient that chemotherapy would cause infertility and he could 
have banked his sperm before submitting to the treatment). 
42. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 39, at 515 (requiring a plaintiff to prove proximate 
causation). 
43. Id. at 495 (footnote omitted). 
44. Tye v. Beausay, 156 N.E.3d 331, 342–43 (Ohio Ct. App. 2020); see also DAN B. DOBBS ET 
AL., supra note 39, at 515 (footnotes omitted) (“[T]he plaintiff must prove five things:  
(1) nondisclosure of required information[;] (2) actual damage . . . [;] (3) resulting from risks about 
which the patient was not informed; (4) factual cause, which is to say that the plaintiff would have 
rejected the medical treatment if she had known the risk[;] and (5) that reasonable persons, if properly 
informed, would have rejected the proposed treatment.”). 
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attached significance to the undisclosed material risks and dangers 
inherently and potentially involved with the procedure and would have 
decided against the procedure.”45  However, the test for materiality in some 
states may be objective or subjective.  In such jurisdictions, information is 
material if it is that “which a reasonable patient would consider in deciding 
whether to undergo the medical procedure[,]”46 or “[i]f the patient attaches 
special importance to some particular matter and the doctor knows or 
should know [that] . . . .”47 
B. Exceptions 
Case law and commentary have recognized there are a limited number of 
situations where a disclosure of risks need not be made.  As the Supreme 
Court of Oklahoma explained in Scott v. Bradford: 48 
There is no need to disclose risks that either ought to be known by everyone 
or are already known to the patient.  Further, the primary duty of a physician 
is to do what is best for his patient and where full disclosure would be 
detrimental to a patient’s total care and best interests a physician may withhold 
such disclosure, for example, where disclosure would alarm an emotionally 
upset or apprehensive patient.  Certainly too, where there is an emergency and 
the patient is in no condition to determine for himself whether treatment 
should be administered, the privilege may be invoked.49 
 
45. Tye, 156 N.E.3d at 343 (quoting White v. Leimbach, 959 N.E.2d 1033, 1041 (Ohio 2011)); 
cf. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 39, at 517 (stating “expert testimony is not required” on the issue 
of materiality).  But see id. at 516 (footnotes omitted) (“[A] little more than half the states, many under 
the command of a statute, appear to adopt the medical standard of disclosure as a general rule rather 
than the materiality standard, or alternatively specify major limitations on the claim that are more 
demanding than the materiality standard.”). 
46. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 39, at 518 (quoting Moure v. Raeuchle, 604 A.2d 1003, 
1008 (Pa. 1992)). 
47. Id.  
48. Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979). 
49. Id. at 558 (footnotes omitted); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON 
ON TORTS 192 (5th ed. 1984) (footnotes omitted) (stating “the physician is not required to disclose 
risks that are unexpected or immaterial” or where the patient has waived the “right to receive the 
information”); Conklin v. Hannoch Weisman, P.C., 678 A.2d 1060, 1069 (N.J. 1996) (discussing 
informed consent in the legal malpractice context, the court stated “some clients may sufficiently 
understand aspects of a financial transaction, such as the priority of mortgages, so as not to impose a 
duty on their lawyer to explain the transaction in detail”). 
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C. Factual Causation of Damages 
Because all negligence actions require proof that damage was caused by a 
breach of duty, a patient must show, in an informed consent action, not only 
that there was a failure to disclose but also that the non-disclosure was 
causally related to some injury.  No action will lie if the factfinder believes 
the patient would have consented to the same course of treatment had full 
disclosure been made.50  Of course, it is difficult to ascertain, 
retrospectively, what a patient would or would not have done had the facts 
been different, and courts, predictably, are split on the question of what test 
to apply in making that inquiry. 
Most jurisdictions have rejected the subjective approach and have 
adopted an objective test, which inquires whether a reasonable person 
would have consented to the treatment if the risks and alternatives had been 
disclosed.51  The theory is that if a reasonable person would have refused 
treatment, it is likely this particular plaintiff would also have refused.  
Some states hold that both a subjective test and an objective test must be 
met.52  In these jurisdictions, a patient will not recover damages in an 
informed consent action if, when fully informed, either a reasonable person 
or the particular plaintiff would have agreed to the treatment in question.53   
D. Medical Informed Consent Statutes 
In some states, the common law doctrine of informed consent in 
medicine has been augmented or replaced by statutory developments.  For 
example, Texas has adopted detailed legislation54 which creates a state 
Medical Disclosure Panel “to determine which risks and hazards related to 
 
50. But see Fitzpatrick v. Natter, 961 A.2d 1229, 1237 (Pa. 2008) (citation omitted) (stating a 
patient bringing a claim based on lack of informed consent must prove the undisclosed “information 
would have factored substantially into her decision-making process.  The patient need not show that 
she would have chosen differently had she possessed the missing information, but only that the missing 
information would have been a substantial factor in this decision”). 
51. See Ashe v. Radiation Oncology Assocs., 9 S.W.3d 119, 122–24 (Tenn. 1999) (endorsing the 
majority objective standard, which requires the jury to find that a reasonable person would have made 
a different decision). 
52. See DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 39, at 522 (discussing the dual requirement). 
53. See id. (“[T]he plaintiff will fail if she would have accepted the medical procedure even when 
fully informed, and she will also fail if she would have rejected [treatment] but a reasonable person 
would not have.”). 
54. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 74.101–.107 (regulating the only theory of 
recovery, the duties and responsibilities of the Texas Medical Disclosure Panel, the disclosure duty of 
physicians or health care providers, the manner and effect of such disclosures, and informed consent 
for hysterectomies). 
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medical care and surgical procedures must be disclosed by health care 
providers or physicians . . . .”55  A New York statute provides: 
Limitation of medical, dental or podiatric malpractice action based on lack of informed 
consent 
1. Lack of informed consent means the failure of the person providing the 
professional treatment or diagnosis to disclose to the patient such 
alternatives thereto and the reasonably foreseeable risks and benefits 
involved as a reasonable medical, dental or podiatric practitioner under 
similar circumstances would have disclosed, in a manner permitting the 
patient to make a knowledgeable evaluation. 
2. The right of action to recover for medical, dental or podiatric malpractice 
based on a lack of informed consent is limited to those cases involving either 
(a) non-emergency treatment, procedure or surgery, or (b) a diagnostic 
procedure which involved invasion or disruption of the integrity of the 
body. 
3. For a cause of action therefor it must also be established that a reasonably 
prudent person in the patient’s position would not have undergone the 
treatment or diagnosis if he had been fully informed and that the lack of 
informed consent is a proximate cause of the injury or condition for which 
recovery is sought. 
4. It shall be a defense to any action for medical, dental or podiatric malpractice 
based upon an alleged failure to obtain such an informed consent that: 
(a) the risk not disclosed is too commonly known to warrant disclosure; or 
(b) the patient assured the medical, dental or podiatric practitioner he 
would undergo the treatment, procedure or diagnosis regardless of the 
risk involved, or the patient assured the medical, dental or podiatric 
practitioner that he did not want to be informed of the matters to which 
he would be entitled to be informed; or 
(c) consent by or on behalf of the patient was not reasonably possible; or 
(d) the medical, dental or podiatric practitioner, after considering all of the 
attendant facts and circumstances, used reasonable discretion as to the 
manner and extent to which such alternatives or risks were disclosed to 
the patient because he reasonably believed that the manner and extent 
 
55. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.102(a). 
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of such disclosure could reasonably be expected to adversely and 
substantially affect the patient’s condition.56 
Some courts have held that carelessness on the part of a patient is a 
defense to an action under the state medical informed consent statute.  For 
example, in Brown v. Dibbell,57 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin stated: 
A patient is usually the primary source of information about the patient’s 
material personal, family and medical histories.  If a doctor is to provide a 
patient with the information required by Wis. Stat. § 448.30, it is imperative 
that in response to a doctor’s material questions a patient provide information 
that is as complete and accurate as possible under the circumstances.58 
III.    INFORMED CONSENT IN THE LAW OF LAWYER DISCIPLINE 
With respect to the practice of law, there is some evidence informed 
consent principles may have been recognized in legal malpractice actions for 
damages even before they formed the basis for lawyer discipline.59  
However, during the past two decades, the pattern of development has been 
strongly to the contrary, spreading informed consent principles from lawyer 
ethics codes to the common law principles, which define the terms for legal 
malpractice liability.  
The American Bar Association (ABA) Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility (Model Code) was promulgated in 1969, and the Model Code 
was amended at various times as late as 1980.60  Versions of the Model 
Code were once the law in almost every state.61  A search of the 1980 text 
 
56. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (McKinney 2021). 
57. Brown v. Dibbell, 595 N.W.2d 358 (Wis. 1999). 
58. Id. at 368. 
59. See Martyn, supra note 13, at 330 (discussing caselaw demonstrating the importance of 
informing clients about their options).  Professor Martyn stated long ago: 
Clients have successfully alleged in malpractice suits, or as grounds for other relief, failure to 
disclose information material to the client’s decision, failure to disclose conflicts of interest, and 
failure to disclose an attorney’s opinion regarding the merits of a case.  By creating an affirmative 
duty to inform the client, these decisions permit the client to make an informed choice about the 
next course of action. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
60. See generally MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESP. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) (detailing the 
responsibilities of lawyers). 
61. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 56 (1986) (“[T]he 1969 Code was 
an impressive and quick success.”).  “[B]y 1972 the adoption committee could report that every 
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of the Model Code reveals that nowhere did it use the term “informed 
consent,” even though the term “consent” was mentioned in at least eight 
Ethical Considerations (ECs)62 and eight Disciplinary Rules (DRs).63  By 
1980, “informed consent,” as a term of art, had not yet found a place in the 
language of lawyer discipline, nor in the developing field of legal malpractice.  
In 1980, Professor Mark Spiegel wrote: 
The doctrine of informed consent . . . combines the patient’s right to make a 
decision with a requirement that the physician provide sufficient information 
to make the exercise of that right meaningful.  No similar general doctrine 
applies to the lawyer-client relationship.64 
Yet, it is possible to see that by 1980 the law of lawyering was moving in 
the direction of recognizing the doctrine of informed consent as a key 
principle.  At least two ECs65 and four DRs66 in the Model Code coupled 
consent with a requirement of full disclosure.  One DR was even more 
specific, conditioning consent to an aggregate settlement on the prior 
disclosure of the “existence and nature of all the claims . . . .”67  By 1986, 
Professor Charles Wolfram’s landmark hornbook, Modern Legal Ethics, richly 
detailed “[a] fuller description than the lawyer codes suggest” concerning 
“the contents of a disclosure or consultation specifically addressed to 
conflicts problems.”68 
In 1983, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility was superseded 
as a pattern ethics code by the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model 
Rules).69  The Model Rules have frequently been amended.  The current 
version of the Model Rules defines the term “informed consent” as follows: 
 
jurisdiction had taken steps to adopt the Code except three states . . . .  Two of those states adopted 
the Code soon thereafter, and it has had a strong influence in California as well . . . .”  Id. at 56–57 
(footnote omitted). 
62. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESP. ECS 2-21, 2-22, 4-2, 4-5. 5-3, 5-16, 6-3, 7-18 (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 1980) (mentioning “consent”). 
63. See id. at DRS 2-107, 4-101, 5-101, 5-104, 5-105, 5-106, 5-107, 7-104 (noting the same). 
64. Spiegel, supra note 13, at 48–49. 
65. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESP. ECS 4-2, 4-5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) (requiring consent 
after full disclosure). 
66. See id. at DRS 4-101, 5-101, 5-104, 5-107 (requiring the same). 
67. Id. at DR 5-106. 
68. WOLFRAM, supra note 61, at 345. 
69. See Michael S. Ariens, American Legal Ethics in an Age of Anxiety, 40 ST. MARY’S L.J. 343, 348 
(2008) (footnotes omitted) (“Despite [the Model Code’s] overwhelming success, the ABA appointed a 
commission in 1977 to evaluate ‘all facets of legal ethics.’  The commission, chaired by Nebraska lawyer 
Robert Kutak, fashioned the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, approved by the ABA in 1983.”). 
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“Informed consent” denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course 
of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and 
explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to 
the proposed course of conduct.70 
The term informed consent, which was added to the Model Rules in 2002, 
“replaced the term ‘consent after consultation,’ which had been used in the 
rules as promulgated in 1983.”71  “[The] change in terminology was not 
controversial, because everyone agreed that the original phraseology was 
intended to convey exactly the same meaning . . . .”72 
The term “informed consent” is used today in the Model Rules in ten 
blackletter rules (often coupled with a requirement that the informed 
consent be “confirmed in writing”)73 and eight official comments.74  The 
blackletter rules provide as follows: 
•  Model Rule 1.2 (“Scope of Representation & Allocation of 
Authority Between Client & Lawyer”): “A lawyer may limit the 
scope of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the 
circumstances and the client gives informed consent[;]”75 
•  Model Rule 1.4 (Communications): “A lawyer shall . . . promptly 
inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to 
which the client’s informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(e), is 
required by these Rules[;]”76 
•  Model Rule 1.6 (Confidentiality of Information): “A lawyer shall not 
reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless 
the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly 
authorized in order to carry out the representation or the disclosure 
 
70. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(e) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). 
71. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING 3-6 (4th ed. 2020). 
72. Id. 
73. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“‘Confirmed in 
writing,’ when used in reference to the informed consent of a person, denotes informed consent that 
is given in writing by the person or a writing that a lawyer promptly transmits to the person confirming 
an oral informed consent. . . .  If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the 
person gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time 
thereafter.”). 
74. Id. at R. 1.1 cmt. 6, R. 1.7 cmt. 1, R. 1.10 cmt. 6, R. 1.17 cmt. 11, R. 3.7 cmt. 6, R. 5.4 cmt. 2, 
R. 6.5 cmt. 2, R. 8.5 cmt. 5. 
75. Id. at R. 1.2(c). 
76. Id. at R. 1.4(a)(1). 
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is permitted by paragraph (b) [which details seven exceptions to the 
duty of confidentiality;]”77 
•  Model Rule 1.7 (“Conflict of Interest: Current Clients”): 
“Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of 
interest . . . a lawyer may represent a client if: . . . each affected client 
gives informed consent, confirmed in writing[;]”78 
•  Model Rule 1.8 (Conflict of Interest: Current Clients: Specific 
Rules):  
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client 
or knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other 
pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless: 
. . . .  
(3) the client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the 
client, to the essential terms of the transaction and the 
lawyer’s role in the transaction, including whether the lawyer 
is representing the client in the transaction;79   
(f) A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client 
from one other than the client unless:  
(1) the client gives informed consent;80  
(g) A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate 
in making an aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the 
clients, or in a criminal case an aggregated agreement as to guilty 
or nolo contendere pleas, unless each client gives informed 
consent, in a writing signed by the client.81 
•  Model Rule 1.9 (Duties to Former Clients): 
(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall 
not thereafter represent another person in the same or a 
substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are 
 
77. Id. at R. 1.6(a)–(b). 
78. Id. at R. 1.7(b)(4). 
79. Id. at R. 1.8(a)(3). 
80. Id. at R. 1.8(f)(1). 
81. Id. at R. 1.8(g). 
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materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the 
former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.82 
(b) A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a 
substantially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer 
formerly was associated had previously represented a client  
(1) whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and 
(2) about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected 
by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) that is material to the matter; unless 
the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in 
writing.83  
•  Model Rule 1.11 (“Special Conflicts of Interest for Former & 
Current Government Officers & Employees”):  
(a) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer who has 
formerly served as a public officer or employee of the 
government:  
(1) is subject to Rule 1.9(c) [restricting use or disclosure of 
information concerning a former client]; and  
(2) shall not otherwise represent a client in connection with a 
matter in which the lawyer participated personally and 
substantially as a public officer or employee, unless the 
appropriate government agency gives its informed consent, 
confirmed in writing, to the representation.84 
(d) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer currently 
serving as a public officer or employee:  
 (1) is subject to Rules 1.7 and 1.9; and  
 (2) shall not:  
(i) participate in a matter in which the lawyer participated 
personally and substantially while in private practice or 
nongovernmental employment, unless the appropriate 
 
82. Id. at R. 1.9(a). 
83. Id. at R. 1.9(b). 
84. Id. at R. 1.11(a)(1)–(2). 
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government agency gives its informed consent, 
confirmed in writing . . . .85 
•  Model Rule 1.12 (“Former Judge, Arbitrator, Mediator or Other 
Third-Party Neutral”):  
(a) Except as stated in paragraph (d), a lawyer shall not represent 
anyone in connection with a matter in which the lawyer 
participated personally and substantially as a judge or other 
adjudicative officer or law clerk to such a person or as an 
arbitrator, mediator or other third-party neutral, unless all parties 
to the proceeding give informed consent, confirmed in writing.86 
•  Model Rule 1.18 (Duties to Prospective Client): “When the lawyer 
has received disqualifying information . . . representation is 
permissible if: (1) both the affected client and the prospective client 
have given informed consent, confirmed in writing”;87 and 
•  Model Rule 2.3 (“Evaluation for Use by Third Persons”): “When 
the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the evaluation is 
likely to affect the client’s interests materially and adversely, the 
lawyer shall not provide the evaluation unless the client gives 
informed consent.”88 
The unifying threat running throughout these black letter rules is that a 
clear majority of the quoted informed consent provisions deal with conflicts 
of interest.89  However, four of the informed consent provisions are 
definitely more wide-ranging and may apply to matters not involving 
conflicts of interest.  These include: Model Rule 1.2 (Scope of 
Representation);90 Model Rule 1.4 (Communications), Model Rule 1.6 
 
85. Id. at R. 1.11(d)(1)–(2)(i). 
86. Id. at R. 1.12(a). 
87. Id. at R. 1.18(d)(1). 
88. Id. at R. 2.3(b). 
89. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE L. GOVERNING LAWS. § 122 (AM. L. INST. 2000) 
(“(1) A lawyer may represent a client notwithstanding a conflict of interest prohibited by  
§ 121 if each affected client or former client gives informed consent to the lawyer’s representation.  
Informed consent requires that the client or former client have reasonably adequate information about 
the material risks of such representation to that client or former client.”). 
90. See SCB Diversified Mun. Portfolio v. Crews & Assocs., No. 09-7251, 2012 WL 13708, at *2 
(E.D. La. Jan. 4, 2012) (noting plaintiff unsuccessfully sought to recover damages against the 
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(Confidentiality of Information), and Model Rule 1.1 comment 6 
(Competence).91  Thus, it is not possible to minimize the breadth of 
informed consent principles in lawyer discipline by dismissing them as 
merely special rules related to conflicts of interest.  Instead, these disclosure 
requirements define a broader range of obligations. 
A failure to obtain informed consent when required by applicable 
disciplinary rules will, of course, give rise to disciplinary liability.92  The next 
Part examines how informed consent principles have been broadly 
incorporated into legal malpractice jurisprudence.  Three types of cases are 
examined: (1) malpractice cases applying the informed consent provisions 
set down in the Model Rules or state variations thereof; (2) malpractice cases 
expressly recognizing the obligations of lawyers to obtain informed consent, 
but not expressly relying on provisions in the Model Rules or state 
variations; and (3) malpractice cases recognizing the obligation of lawyers to 
disclose the risks of, and alternatives to, a proposed course of action, but 
without using the language of informed consent or expressly relying on the 
Model Rules or state variations.  These cases show, in a wide range of 
disputes, failure to disclose risks and alternatives and obtain informed 
consent will support a legal malpractice action for damages.   
Over the course of many years, the extension of informed consent 
principles from medical malpractice law to legal malpractice law was aided 
by the arguments of scholars who sought to advance this course of 
jurisprudential development.93  The continuing influence of medical 
 
defendants for, among other things, “failure to obtain informed consent for the limited scope of 
representation it outlined in its engagement letter”). 
91. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 6 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2020) (“Before a 
lawyer retains or contracts with other lawyers outside the lawyer’s own firm to provide or assist in the 
provision of legal services to a client, the lawyer should ordinarily obtain informed consent from the 
client and must reasonably believe that the other lawyers’ services will contribute to the competent and 
ethical representation of the client.”). 
92. See Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Begovic, 137 N.E.3d 87, 92, 95 (Ohio 2019) (imposing a one-
year suspension from practice based on various ethics violations, including the lawyer’s violation of 
“his duty to inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client’s 
informed consent was required and the duty to keep the client reasonably informed”); see also Iowa Sup. 
Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Willey, 889 N.W.2d 647, 658 (Iowa 2017) (suspending an attorney’s license 
to practice law “with no possibility of reinstatement for sixty days” based on failure to obtain informed 
consent to various conflicts); Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Shapiro, 108 A.3d 394, 418 (Md. 
2015) (basing an indefinite suspension, in part, on violations of the informed consent duties imposed 
by the disciplinary rules); Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Walker, 32 N.E.3d 437, 438–39 (Ohio 2015) 
(imposing a one-year suspension based, in part, on a violation of informed consent requirements). 
93. See Martyn, supra note 13, at 310–11, 346–47 (examining the “philosophical basis and the 
common law roots of the informed consent doctrine” and proposing a model statute); see also Lisa G. 
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malpractice law on legal malpractice law is sometimes vividly apparent with 
respect to informed consent.  In Washington State, for example, the 
language of the legal malpractice informed consent jury instruction “is nearly 
identical to Washington pattern instruction 105.04, the medical health care 
informed consent instruction.”94  
IV.    INFORMED CONSENT IN LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW 
It is not surprising that the doctrine of informed consent is now 
recognized in legal malpractice law as well as medical malpractice law: 
Clients, like patients, have a right to exercise extensive control over their own 
affairs, including their legal representation.  Consequently, there is no reason 
why the informed consent doctrine should not apply as readily to legal 
malpractice cases as it does in suits against physicians.95  
A. Malpractice Cases Citing and Applying Informed Consent Provisions Found in 
Ethics Rules 
It is well established that the mere violation of a disciplinary rule by an 
attorney does not create a civil cause of action for an aggrieved client.  
However, it is equally clear that in legal malpractice actions, many courts 
treat the disciplinary rules as evidence of the standard of care, and violations 
of those rules as evidence of professional negligence or breach of fiduciary 
duty.  According to the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers: 
  
 
Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 659, 670 (1990) (“Some scholars call for an informed 
consent doctrine in legal malpractice, such as has become a standard in medical malpractice.”); Paul R. 
Tremblay, On Persuasion and Paternalism: Lawyer Decisionmaking and the Questionably Competent Client, 
1987 UTAH L. REV. 515, 515 n.1 (stating “[m]uch has been written over the past two decades about 
informed consent and its applicability to lawyering” and identifying commentators and scholars). 
94. Edleman v. Russell, 167 Wash. App. 1050, at *4 n.3 (Apr. 30, 2012). 
95. Fortney & Johnson, Legal Malpractice, supra note 1, § 5-2.2(n), at 769.  But see Conklin v. 
Hannoch Weisman, 678 A.2d 1060, 1069 (N.J. 1996) (“The difference that we see is that in many 
instances the business client, unlike the medical patient, is not sick when the client consults an attorney.  
The business client is often motivated to enter into a legal transaction for many more reasons than a 
medical patient and may be at no risk at all at the inception of the transaction.  Moreover, while most 
patients will not appreciate the risks of medical treatments absent an explanation by a doctor, many 
clients may understand as well as their attorney, if not better, the risks of a commercial business 
transaction.”). 
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Proof of violation of a rule or statute regulating the conduct of lawyers: 
(a)  does not give rise to an implied cause of action for professional 
negligence or breach of fiduciary duty; 
(b)  does not preclude other proof concerning the duty of care . . . ; and 
(c)  may be considered by a trier of fact as an aid in understanding and 
applying the standard of [care] to the extent that (i) the rule or statute 
was designed for the protection of persons in the position of the 
claimant and (ii) proof of the content and construction of such a rule 
or statute is relevant to the claimant’s claim.96 
Legal malpractice cases frequently refer to the informed consent 
requirements imposed by the Model Rules, or state variations thereof, in 
explaining the standard of care applicable to claims by clients against 
lawyers.97  Some of these cases do little to illuminate the requirements of 
 
96. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE L. GOVERNING LAWS. § 52(2) (AM. L. INST. 2000). 
97. See, e.g., Dziesinski v. Mack, No. 208555, 1999 WL 33327124, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 
1999) (“Defendant failed to discuss with plaintiffs any potential or actual conflict of interest arising out 
of his simultaneous representation of them and Brian.  Disclosure of any such potential or actual 
conflict of interest is required.  MRPC 1.7. . . .  [I]t was more likely than not that defendant’s actions 
resulted in actual injury to plaintiffs . . . .”).  But see ITC Com. Funding, LLC v. Crerar, 713 S.E.2d 335, 
337–38 (S.C. Ct. App. 2011) (stating the rule does not create a presumption of a breach of duty).  
The Crerar court wrote: 
The Appellant argues West represented her in default negotiations for one year, and she had the 
right to assume he would continue to represent her.  The Appellant contends that considering 
her age and inexperience in legal matters, West’s letter should have contained an explanation of 
the risks regarding his limited representation.  She also maintains West should have discussed his 
representation with her personally and in the presence of a family member or family attorney, and 
obtained a response from her to ensure she understood his inability to represent her.  The 
Appellant contends the trial court erred in failing to consider Rule 1.2 of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct (RPC), Rule 407, SCACR. 
Pursuant to Rule 1.2(c), RPC: “A lawyer may limit the scope of the representation if the 
limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent.”  
Informed consent “denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the 
lawyer has communicated reasonably adequate information and explanation about the material 
risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.” 
. . . . 
We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding West’s letter to the Appellant 
sufficiently advised her that West could not represent her.  While the Appellant maintains she is 
entitled to relief from judgment because she did not give West her informed consent pursuant to 
Rule 1.2(c), RPC, we note our supreme court determined “the failure to comply with the RPC 
should not . . . be considered as evidence of negligence per se.”  Smith v. Haynsworth, Marion, 
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informed consent or the potential applicability of informed consent 
obligations to cases not citing disciplinary rules imposing such requirements.  
Other cases are very much to the contrary. 
1. The Aggregate Settlement Rule 
Some of the references in legal malpractice cases to “informed consent” 
are related to the Model Rule provision imposing informed consent 
requirements tied to aggregate settlements.98  Consider, for example, Frank 
v. OOO RM Invest.99  In that case, the analysis of a federal court in New 
York unhesitatingly embraced provisions patterned on the informed 
consent requirements of Model Rule 1.8(g)100 in ruling on motions in a legal 
malpractice case.  As the court explained: 
The parties dispute the relevance of a rule governing the Florida Bar, referred 
to as an “aggregate settlement rule,” which provides that “[a] lawyer who 
represents 2 or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate 
settlement of the claims of or against the clients . . . unless each client gives 
informed consent, in a writing signed by the client.”  The Settling Parties’ 
counterclaim alleges that the Frank Parties committed legal malpractice by 
negotiating the underlying settlement “without first seeking and obtaining an 
agreement among the Settling Parties regarding the division of the Settlement 
 
McKay & Geurard, 322 S.C. 433, 437 n.6, 472 S.E.2d 612, 614 n.6 (1996); see also Preamble to 
RPC, Rule 407, SCACR (“[A] violation of a Rule should not itself give rise to a cause of action 
against a lawyer nor should it create any presumption in such a case that a legal duty has been 
breached”). 
Id. at 337–38 (alterations in original) (second omission in original). 
98. See Booth v. Davis, No. 10-4010-KHV, 2016 WL 1624076, at *8 (D. Kan. Apr. 25, 2016) 
(“[P]laintiffs assert that Davis breached his duties to Connie and Scott Booth (1) in negotiating the 
aggregate settlement without pushing for a better offer, (2) failing to disclose to Connie Booth the 
existence and nature of all claims and the participation of each person in the aggregate settlement and 
thus (3) failing to obtain her informed consent to the aggregate global settlement.”).  Booth was later 
affirmed.  Booth v. Davis, 690 F. App’x 571, 573–75 (10th Cir. 2017).  The opinion of the Tenth Circuit 
mentioned, but did not discuss, the informed consent requirement for aggregate settlements.  Id. 
at 573, 575. 
99. Frank v. OOO RM Inv., No. 17-CV-1338 (NGG) (ARL), 2020 WL 7022317 (E.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 30, 2020). 
100. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“A lawyer who 
represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement of the claims of 
or against the clients, or in a criminal case an aggregated agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere 
pleas, unless each client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client.  The lawyer’s 
disclosure shall include the existence and nature of all the claims or pleas involved and of the 
participation of each person in the settlement.”). 
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Funds as required by Rule 4-1.8(g).” . . .   [U.S. Magistrate] Judge Lindsay 
recommended denying the Frank Parties’ motion to dismiss this aspect of the 
malpractice claim, finding that the Frank Parties’ compliance with the rule was 
a factual issue, and that its alleged violation of the rule could be evidence of 
negligence. . . .  
The Settling Parties contend that by failing to address the apportionment of 
the settlement among its clients, the Frank Parties deprived them of their 
ability to give informed consent to the settlement, as required by the aggregate 
settlement rule. . . .  
Because the Frank Parties do not adequately establish that their alleged failure 
to counsel their clients to determine how the settlement funds would be 
divided is not actionable, the court agrees with Judge Lindsay and declines to 
dismiss that aspect of the legal malpractice counterclaim.101 
The Frank opinion further indicates the court believed informed consent 
language based on the Model Rules is shaping the law of legal malpractice 
broadly.  The court wrote: 
Khavinson’s objection to Judge Lindsay’s consideration of the aggregate 
settlement rule misses the mark.  Khavinson suggests that the rule is irrelevant 
to the evaluation of whether he behaved negligently because he is not a 
member of the Florida Bar and did not seek [pro hac vice] admission . . . in 
connection with the underlying litigation.  However, as the Settling Parties 
point out, the Bars of many other states, including New York, have 
substantially identical rules.  Thus, regardless of which jurisdiction’s rule 
applied to Khavinson, he cannot establish that the substance of the aggregate 
settlement rule was irrelevant to the standards of professional conduct that 
governed his behavior. . . .  [T]he court finds that the counter-defendants’ 
compliance with the aggregate settlement rule is relevant evidence regarding 
their alleged negligence . . . .102 
In Jones v. ABC Insurance Co.,103 a Louisiana appellate court appeared to 
have no doubt that a legal malpractice claim could be grounded in the 
“informed consent” language of Louisiana’s versions of Model Rule 1.8 
 
101. Frank, 2020 WL 7022317, at *14 (first alteration in original) (first omission in original) 
(citations omitted). 
102. Id. at *16 (citations omitted). 
103. Jones v. ABC Ins. Co., 249 So. 3d 310 (La. Ct. App. 2018). 
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(dealing with aggregate settlements) and Model Rule 1.4 (dealing with 
communication).  The court wrote: 
Rule 1.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct requires that an attorney give a 
client sufficient information to participate intelligently in decisions concerning 
the objectives of the representation.  A legal malpractice claim for failure to 
obtain informed consent, therefore, is based upon allegations that the attorney 
failed to properly communicate sufficient information to the client in order 
that the client can make an intelligent decision concerning the objectives of 
the representation.  The issue of lack of informed consent therefore raises the 
question of with whom Mr. Roth had a duty to communicate regarding the 
settlement of Haley’s lawsuit.104 
The Jones court answered that question adverse to the plaintiff because 
the lawyer who was first hired to represent the interests of an unemancipated 
child in a personal injury suit had been discharged by the plaintiff’s mother, 
who subsequently hired another lawyer who represented the child’s interests 
at the time of settlement.105 
2. The Former Client Conflict of Interest Rule 
Today, cases readily adopt the informed consent language of the Model 
Rules, or the relevant state variation, as defining the standard of care in legal 
malpractice actions.  For example, in Abreu v. Mackiewicz,106 a legal 
malpractice action, a New Jersey appellate court reviewed a no cause 
judgment after a jury trial.  In affirming the judgment, the court wrote: 
After informing the jury that RPC 1.7 [the current client conflict of interest 
rule] did not apply, but RPC 1.9 [the former client conflict of interest rule] 
did, the court recited RPC 1.9(a), which states: “A lawyer who has represented 
a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another client in the same or 
a substantially related matter in which that client’s interests are materially 
adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives 
informed consent confirmed in writing.”  The court instructed, 
“Now . . . that’s the duty that Mr. Mackiewicz had.  Whether he breached that 
 
104. Id. at 319. 
105. Id. at 320. 
106. Abreu v. Mackiewicz, No. A-2828-09T3, 2012 WL 6027701 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
Dec. 5, 2012). 
  
2021] The Informed Consent Doctrine in Legal Malpractice Law 389 
duty involves an assessment of the facts which you have to decide.”  The court 
proceeded to . . . explain what constituted “informed consent.”107 
The appellate court held it was not reversible error for the trial judge to 
distribute to the jury a written copy of New Jersey’s version of Model 
Rule 1.9 (and its informed consent requirements) because “[t]he distribution 
of the rule was designed to avoid confusion, and was not likely to lead to 
overemphasis on the rule.”108 
In Annie Sloan Interiors, Ltd. v. Kappel,109 Annie Sloan Interiors (ASI) 
alleged that an attorney, Kappel, breached his fiduciary duties and 
committed legal malpractice “by representing Jolie Design & Decor, Inc. 
(“JDD”) and Jolie Home, LLC (“Jolie Home”) in an attack on the CHALK 
PAINT® trademark” despite the fact that “he had previously represented 
ASI in registering and defending the trademark.”110  In denying the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss, a federal court in Louisiana relied in part on 
the informed consent language of a Louisiana former client conflict of 
interest rule patterned on ABA Model Rule 1.9.111  The court wrote: 
The Louisiana State Bar Association’s Rules of Professional Conduct (“RPC”) 
“have the force and effect of substantive law.” 
. . . . 
By its terms, the duty of loyalty codified in RPC 1.9 applies to former 
representation, and thus survives termination of the representation.  
Accordingly, the 2015 termination letter, if effective, is irrelevant to the breach 
of fiduciary duty claim based upon Kappel’s former representation.  Second, 
no breach of confidentiality is required to bring a claim under RPC 1.9(a).  All 
that is required is that the new client’s interests be adverse to the original 
client’s interests in a substantially related matter, and that the original client 
did not provide informed consent to the new representation. 
 
107. Id. at *10 (first omission in original). 
108. Id. at *13. 
109. Annie Sloan Interiors, Ltd. v. Kappel, No. 19-807, 2019 WL 2492303 (E.D. La. June 14, 
2019). 
110. Id. at *1. 
111. Model Rule 1.9 provides in relevant part: “(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a 
client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related 
matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless 
the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 1.9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). 
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Defendants argue that ASI provided informed consent to Kappel’s later 
representation of JDD and Jolie Home, because ASI executed a conflict 
waiver at the time Kappel took on the representation.  However, while a 
conflict waiver was executed waiving the conflict with Kappel with respect to 
representation of ASI and JDD, no waiver was executed waiving a conflict 
with respect to Kappel’s subsequent representation of Jolie Home.  Therefore, 
the waiver does not constitute informed consent to Kappel’s representation of 
Jolie Home. 
. . . .   
In sum, ASI’s argument is straightforward: it alleges that Kappel breached 
a duty of loyalty by using knowledge gained during his representation of ASI 
to assist a different client in a challenge to its mark, and that its damages 
consist of the money expended in defending the mark and any resulting 
diminution in the value of the mark.  The claim is plausible on its face, and 
under the facts pleaded, the court could “draw the reasonable inference that 
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” and thus the claim can 
withstand a 12(b)(6) challenge.112  
The court’s three quoted references to informed consent leave little doubt 
it believed informed consent was an essential touchstone in determining 
whether there was a breach of fiduciary duty based on an alleged former 
client conflict of interest.  In addition, the court found that in the absence 
of “informed consent to Kappel’s representation of Jolie Home,” a claim 
for breach of fiduciary duty was “plausible on its face.”113 
3. The Current Client Conflict of Interest Rule 
The informed consent requirements imposed by the current client 
conflict of interest provisions of the Model Rules, and by state variations,114 
 
112. Kappel, 2019 WL 2492303, at *2–3 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
113. Id. at 3. 
114. See England v. Feldman, No. 11 Civ. 1396(CM), 2011 WL 1239775, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 28, 2011) (refusing to dismiss a legal malpractice claim based on negligence because the 
defendant’s alleged violation of the informed consent requirements for joint representation set down 
in the state’s disciplinary rules tended to show the defendant’s conduct fell below the standard of care); 
see also Flycell, Inc. v. Schlossberg LLC, No. 11-CV-0915-CM, 2011 WL 5130159, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 28, 2011) (discussing a malpractice claim alleging “[d]efendants ignored their duties to investigate 
conflicts of interest associated with their dual representation and seek [p]laintiff’s informed consent”); 
Frias Holding Co. v. Greenberg Traurig, LLP, No. 2:11-cv-160-GMN-VCF, 2012 WL 4490855, at *7 
(D. Nev. Sept. 27, 2012) (discussing “a plausible [legal malpractice] claim that [d]efendants failed to 
obtain [p]laintiffs’ informed consent to [a] conflict”). 
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are readily recognized in legal malpractice actions for damages115 and 
related litigation, such as claims for disgorgement116 or unpaid attorney’s 
fees.117  Ordinarily, “[a] proper conflict waiver requires the client’s 
‘informed written consent,’ meaning the attorney must tell the client about 
all the relevant circumstances and material risks, including any actual and 
reasonably foreseeable adverse consequences from the representation.”118  
The Restatement is even more specific: 
In a multiple-client situation, the information normally should address the 
interests of the lawyer and other client giving rise to the conflict; contingent, 
 
115. For example, in Rivera v. Estate of Ruiz, a federal court in New York wrote: 
In an action for legal malpractice where a plaintiff alleges that her attorney had a conflict of 
interest, “the client must demonstrate that (1) a conflict existed and (2) that [she] was damaged 
thereby.” . . .  If such a conflict exists, Rule 1.7(b) states that, in order [for a lawyer] to represent 
parties with conflicting interests, . . . “each affected client” must give “informed consent, 
confirmed in writing.”  
Rivera v. Est. of Ruiz, No. 16 Civ. 7328 (ER), 2020 WL 1503663, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2020) (first 
alteration in original) (citation omitted).  See Scott v. Chuhak & Tecson, P.C., No. 09 C 6858, 
2011 WL 4462915, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2011) (alterations in original) (“Rules 1.4 and 1.7, which 
require a lawyer to obtain informed consent from a client when ‘there is a significant risk that the 
[lawyer’s] representation of [the client] will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to 
another client,’ are the embodiment of the duty of ‘undivided fidelity’ that lawyers, as a matter of law, 
owe to their clients.”); Stanley v. Richmond, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 768, 774, 776 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (finding 
claims for professional negligence and breach of fiduciary duty in an action involving failure to obtain 
informed written consent to a conflict of interest); LK Operating, LLC v. Collection Grp., 331 P.3d 
1147, 1168 (Wash. 2014) (affirming a malpractice judgment where an attorney “violated former 
RPC 1.7 by engaging in simultaneous representation of multiple clients with adverse interests without 
making the necessary disclosures or receiving the clients’ informed consent”); Salvemini v. Spector, 
No. A-3579-11T2, 2013 WL 6508500, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 13, 2013) (“The judge 
instructed the jury that it could consider RPC 1.7 . . . in determining the standard of care and any 
deviation from that standard.”). 
116. See Rodriguez v. Disner, 688 F.3d 645, 653–55 (9th Cir. 2012) (affirming a denial of all fees 
and stating that “[t]he representation of clients with conflicting interests and without informed consent 
is a particularly egregious ethical violation that may be a proper basis for complete denial of fees”); 
Giannini, Chin & Valinoti v. Super. Ct. of San Francisco, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 394, 405, 407 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1995) (recognizing, in a malpractice action seeking fee disgorgement, the “attorneys’ duties to obtain 
informed consent before engaging [in] representing a client in the face of a potential conflict of 
interest[,]” and holding summary judgment was improperly granted to the defendant-lawyer). 
117. See Brown Rudnick, LLP v. Surgical Orthomedics, Inc., No. 13-CV-4348 (JMF), 
2014 WL 3439620, at *5, 9 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2014) (quoting the informed consent requirements set 
down by New York’s current-client conflict of interest rule in the context of malpractice claims asserted 
incidental to a fee dispute). 
118. Michael S. Leboff, Increase Collections and Avoid Costly Fee Disputes: Nine Practical Tips, 
62 ORANGE CNTY. LAW. 37, 37–38 (2020). 
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optional, and tactical considerations and alternative courses of action that 
would be foreclosed or made less readily available by the conflict; the effect 
of the representation or the process of obtaining other clients’ informed 
consent upon confidential information of the client; any material reservations 
that a disinterested lawyer might reasonably harbor about the arrangement if 
such a lawyer were representing only the client being advised; and the 
consequences and effects of a future withdrawal of consent by any client, 
including, if relevant, the fact that the lawyer would withdraw from 
representing all clients.119 
A lawyer’s failure to obtain informed consent to a conflict will establish 
that the defendant-lawyer breached a duty of care to the client, though it will 
still be necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the breach caused 
damages120 and that the claim is not barred by an applicable defense or 
privilege.121 
Sports Management Network v. Busch122 involved a claim by a race car driver 
against the lawyer who represented him.  One of the issues in the case was 
whether a fee modification agreement was enforceable by the lawyer against 
the client.  As a federal court in Michigan explained: 
The alleged 2013 RA [Representation Agreement] Modification is violative of 
Michigan’s Rules of Professional Ethics.  It required [lawyer] John Caponigro 
to split his loyalty between his client and his company, between his client and 
his company’s clients, and between his client and his law firm’s clients.  The 
Court need not rule on whether all these conflicts were even waivable, because 
no one ever asked Busch for informed consent.  Knowledge[] that one’s 
attorney represents adverse parties is no substitute for a candid explanation of 
why such conflicts may impair the quality of the attorney’s representation, and 
why retaining outside counsel is advisable.  Though an agent’s connection to 
racing teams may be exactly what attracts drivers to seek his or her 
representation, when the agent is also providing legal services he or she must 
be sure that the driver understands what he or she is giving up by becoming a 
client of his boss’s attorney. 
 
119. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE L. GOVERNING LAWS. § 122 cmt. c(i) (AM. L. INST. 
2000) (citation omitted). 
120. See Fortney & Johnson, Legal Malpractice, supra note 1, § 5-2.3, at 772 (discussing factual and 
proximate causation); id. § 5-5.1, at 851 (discussing compensatory damages). 
121. See id. § 5-6.1, at 867 (discussing defenses and obstacles to recovery). 
122. Sports Mgmt. Network v. Busch, No. 17-10413, 2019 WL 1057314 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 6, 
2019). 
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Because SMN and FCWS failed to provide his client with a meaningful 
choice on whether such conflicts were permissible, they will not be able to 
enforce their 2013 RA Modification.  This does not mean that their 
representation actually caused injury, however.  Having reviewed the record, 
the Court finds that Busch has not advanced sufficient evidence of damages 
to bring the case to a jury.123 
In the case of In re Concepts America, Inc.,124 the complaint contained “a 
single count for legal malpractice[,]” which alleged that the defendants had 
breached their duties to the plaintiffs by, among other things, “advising 
Greenfield to ‘restructure’ operations so that successor entities and Plaintiffs 
were subjected to claims of fraud and fraudulent transfer,” and “failing to 
properly advise Greenfield of the conflict of interest and his right to 
independent counsel[.]”125  The United States Bankruptcy Court sitting in 
Illinois found that: 
“[The plaintiff’s] allegations clearly invoke[d] Defendants’ obligations under 
Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.4(b), to provide necessary 
information to a client, and Rule 1.7(b), to obtain informed consent when the 
lawyer’s personal interests pose a significant risk of materially limiting the 
representation.”126   
However, the court found the plaintiffs’ pleadings to be deficient.  It 
wrote: “If Plaintiffs wish to allege that RSP Defendants breached its duty of 
care by failing to provide necessary information and to obtain informed 
consent, Plaintiffs must amend their complaint to allege sufficient factual 
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief.”127  The plaintiffs were 
granted leave to amend their complaint.128 
4. The Business Transaction Conflict of Interest Rule 
In Robinson-Podoll v. Harmelink, Fox & Ravnsborg Law Office,129 a legal 
malpractice action, one of the questions was whether an attorney breached 
 
123. Id. at *11. 
124. In re Concepts Am., Inc., No. 14 B 34232, 2020 WL 6929249 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Aug. 17, 
2020). 
125. Id. at *3–4. 
126. Id. at *7. 
127. Id. at *8. 
128. Id. at *10. 
129. Robinson-Podoll v. Harmelink, Fox & Ravnsborg L. Off., 939 N.W.2d 32 (S.D. 2020). 
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her professional duties to a client, by taking an anniversary ring as collateral 
for a $3,800.00 loan and continuing to hold the ring without returning it to 
the client.130  Discussing relevant authority, the Supreme Court of South 
Dakota wrote: 
Rule of Professional Responsibility 1.8 prohibits a lawyer from knowingly 
acquiring “an ownership, possessory security or other pecuniary interest 
adverse to the client unless:” the attorney satisfies three stated requirements, 
including a written disclosure by the attorney for the client to seek 
independent legal advice and a written and signed informed consent by the 
client.  We discussed in Behrens, 2005 S.D. 79, ¶ 51, 698 N.W.2d at 576, that 
Rule 1.8, regarding conflict of interests, may support a separate tort duty.131 
Thus, the Robinson-Podoll court clearly signaled that the informed consent 
provisions of the disciplinary rule regulating business transactions between 
lawyers and clients may set the standard of care for a malpractice action. 
Other recent cases have reached similar conclusions.  For example, in Sin 
Ho Nam v. Quichocho,132 an “exotic island real estate contract dispute 
between a Saipan lawyer lessor . . . and a Korean businessman,”133 the 
client/lessee asserted a breach of fiduciary duty claim “against the attorney-
lessor, with whom the lessee believed that he had an attorney-client 
relationship.”134  The federal District Court for the Northern Mariana 
Islands quoted the provisions of Model Rule 1.8, which govern business 
transactions between lawyers and clients.135  The court denied the 
defendant attorney-lessor’s motion for summary judgment, stating: 
[T]he greatest uncertainty is whether Nam [the lessee and putative client] gave 
informed consent not just to the terms of the transaction, but to [attorney-
lessor] Quichocho’s “role in the transaction, including whether the lawyer is 
representing the client in the transaction.”136 
 
130. Id. at 37. 
131. Id. at 48 n.11. 
132. Sin Ho Nam v. Quichocho, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1152 (D. N. Mar. I. 2011). 
133. Id. at 1154. 
134. Id. 
135. See id. at 1178 (alteration in original) (questioning whether Quichocho “fully disclosed and 
transmitted the terms of the transaction ‘in a manner that can be reasonably understood by [Nam]’”). 
136. Id. 
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5. The Confidentiality Rule 
St. John Haney v. Kavoukjian137 involved professional negligence and 
breach of fiduciary duty claims that arose from estate planning work.   
[The] Plaintiffs allege[d] Defendant Kavoukjian breached professional and 
fiduciary duties owed to Muriel Farr when he sent an email in 2016 to a third-
party that allegedly represented the Farr Claimants and divulged confidential 
information obtained during his representation of Muriel Farr.138 
A federal court in South Carolina recognized the potential relevance of 
informed consent principles by stating:  
Plaintiffs’ claims implicate duties that arise out of a fiduciary relationship. . . .  
South Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct (“RPC”), Rule 1.6 states that 
lawyers owe a duty of confidentiality to their clients and “(a) shall not reveal 
information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives 
informed consent, or the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry 
out the representation, or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b).[”] 
. . . . 
Plaintiffs’ claims also implicate a lawyer’s duty of loyalty owed to clients.  
The RPC generally prohibits lawyers from revealing information related to a 
lawyer’s prior representation of a former client.  Rule 1.9 reads in pertinent 
part: 
“(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not 
thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related 
matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests 
of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent 
confirmed in writing . . . .”139 
However, the judge concluded that, on the facts in the case, it was 
“premature for the Court to determine which duties Defendants owed 
Muriel Farr and whether Defendants breached any duty or deviated from 
any standard of care.”140 
 
137. St. John Haney v. Kavoukjian, No. 2:19-cv-2098-RMG, 2020 WL 2092490 (D.S.C. May 1, 
2020). 
138. Id. at *1. 
139. Id. at *3. (third omission in original) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
140. Id. at *5. 
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In Parkinson v. Bevis,141 the Supreme Court of Idaho addressed a breach 
of fiduciary duty claim based on breach of confidentiality.  The court 
allowed an equitable fee forfeiture claim to go forward because there were 
sufficient facts alleging (attorney) Bevis “breached his fiduciary duty to 
Parkinson by forwarding an email without her informed consent,” even if 
the breach was the result of negligent acts.142 
B. Cases Using the Term “Informed Consent” But Not Citing Ethics Rules  
The language of informed consent increasingly appears in legal 
malpractice cases even when there is no direct link to similar language in the 
Model Rules or state ethics codes.143  For example, Atlanta Channel, Inc. v. 
Solomon144 involved “legal malpractice claims stemming from a [lawyer’s] 
failure to completely fill out a form sent to the Federal Communications 
Commission” on behalf of a client, ACI.145  The lawyer (Solomon) then 
moved to a different law firm—the Garvey Firm—where a Ms. Virtue 
allegedly “took over ACI’s attempt to remedy the effects of the incomplete 
submission, [and] failed to fulfill several ‘obligations’ she owed to 
ACI . . . .”146   
In the malpractice action, “ACI argue[d] that Ms. Virtue should have 
alerted ACI that Mr. Solomon had committed malpractice by failing to 
 
141. Parkinson v. Bevis, 448 P.3d 1027 (Idaho 2019). 
142. Id. at 1027, 1037. 
143. See Friedman v. Kahn, No. 1-12-0881, 2013 IL App (1st) 120881-U, ¶¶ 51–54 (Ill. App. 
Ct. Dec. 27, 2013) (discussing informed consent in legal malpractice and medical malpractice.); Peters 
v. Hyatt Legal Servs., 469 S.E.2d 481, 484 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (stating “Hyatt represented adverse 
parties in a divorce proceeding without obtaining the informed consent of both,” in terms that echoed, 
but did not cite, the informed consent requirements of Model Rule 1.7 or state variations); Walden v. 
Hoke, 429 S.E.2d 504, 509–10 (W. Va. 1993) (stating “it is improper for a lawyer to represent both the 
husband and the wife at any stage of the separation and divorce proceeding, even with full disclosure 
and informed consent[,]” but finding a legal malpractice action was properly dismissed because “no 
evidence was presented showing that the [lawyer’s] preparation of the answer prejudiced the 
[plaintiff]”). 
In O’Neal v. Agee, a husband and wife sued their lawyers for legal malpractice arising from their 
simultaneous representation of the husband’s personal injury claims and the wife’s loss of consortium 
claim arising from an auto accident.  O’Neal v. Agee, 8 S.W.3d 238, 240–41 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).  In 
the action, the plaintiffs alleged that “Ms. Agee [a lawyer] was negligent in having them execute general 
releases, which had the legal effect of releasing drivers # 2 and # 4, without plaintiffs’ informed 
consent.”  Id. 
144. Atlanta Channel, Inc. v. Solomon, No. 15-1823 (RC), 2020 WL 4219757 (D.D.C. July 23, 
2020). 
145. Id. at *1. 
146. Id. 
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complete the form, that the statute of limitations was running on that claim, 
that the Garvey Firm had a potential conflict of interest, and that ACI 
should consult with independent counsel.”147  As stated by a federal court 
in the District of Columbia, “ACI argues that Ms. Virtue ‘failed to obtain 
ACI’s fully informed consent to her assumption of responsibility for and 
working on the FCC Proceeding and Appeal.’”148  Without expressly 
addressing the informed consent claim, the court ruled it would “not declare 
as a matter of law that Ms. Virtue did not owe her client, ACI, a duty 
resembling the ‘obligations’ ACI claims were required.”149 
Similarly, in D&S Remodeling, LLC v. Pinciaro,150 a plaintiff asserting a 
legal malpractice claim made three references to informed consent, none of 
them relating to a provision in the Model Rules or a state ethics code that 
requires informed consent.  According to the Connecticut Superior Court, 
the plaintiff alleged: 
The defendants agreed to provide the plaintiff with legal representation on a 
number of cases . . . .  The defendants settled Mariani without the plaintiff’s 
informed consent, and the plaintiff neither consented to the payment of sums 
to the Mariani plaintiffs, nor waived its claims against the Mariani plaintiffs.  
The defendants also filed a withdrawal of action in ADC, which was granted 
by the court on the same day, without the plaintiff’s informed consent. . . .  
The defendants breached the applicable standard of care owed to the plaintiff 
in that they failed to abide by the plaintiff’s wishes and instructions and obtain 
the plaintiff’s informed consent regarding Mariani and ADC . . . .151 
However, the court did not rule on the informed consent claims. 
1. Arbitration Provisions 
There is no provision in the Model Rules that expressly conditions the 
validity of an arbitration provision in a lawyer-client contract on informed 
consent from the client.  Nevertheless, in Castillo v. Arrieta,152 a New Mexico 
appellate court found that informed consent was the appropriate standard 
for determining whether an arbitration provision was valid, stating: 
 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at *3. 
149. Id. at *2. 
150. D&S Remodeling, LLC v. Pinciaro, 66 Conn. L. Rptr. 369 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 17, 2018) 
(No. FSTCV1616029768), 2018 WL 2422903, at *1. 
151. Id. at *1. 
152. Castillo v. Arrieta, 368 P.3d 1249 (N.M. Ct. App. 2016). 
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We conclude that if an attorney is going to require his client, within the 
context of their relationship of trust, to waive the right to a jury trial for a 
future malpractice dispute, such a waiver should be made knowingly with the 
client’s informed consent.  “[F]or the purpose of obtaining informed consent, 
adequate communication will ordinarily include disclosure of the facts and 
circumstances giving rise to the situation, any explanation reasonably 
necessary to inform the client or other person of the material advantages and 
disadvantages of the proposed course of conduct and a discussion of the 
client’s or other person’s options and alternatives.”  At a minimum, the 
attorney should inform his client that arbitration will constitute a waiver of 
important rights, including, the right to a jury trial, potentially the right to 
broad discovery, and the right to an appeal on the merits.153 
The Castillo court justified the application of an informed consent 
standard by reference to an “attorney’s fiduciary duties of ‘candor and 
loyalty in all dealings with a client[,]’”154 and to the Model Rule on 
communication which requires a lawyer to “explain a matter to the extent 
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions 
regarding the representation.”155 
Other courts have reached similar conclusions.  For example, in Snow v. 
Bernstein, Shur, Sawyer & Nelson, P.A.,156 the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Maine held that “Maine attorneys must obtain a client’s informed consent 
regarding the scope and effect of any contractual provision that 
 
153. Id. at 1257 (alteration in original) (citation omitted); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. 
Resp., Formal Op. 02-425, at 1 (2002) (“It is permissible under the Model Rules to include in a retainer 
agreement with a client a provision that requires the binding arbitration of disputes concerning fees 
and malpractice claims, provided that the client has been fully apprised of the advantages and 
disadvantages of arbitration and has given her informed consent to the inclusion of the arbitration 
provision in the retainer agreement.”). 
154. Castillo, 368 P.3d at 1256 (alteration in original). 
155. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020); see Castillo, 368 P.3d 
at 1257 (quoting the New Mexico Rules of Professional Conduct, which are “identical to Model 
Rule 1.4(b)”). 
156. Snow v. Bernstein, Shur, Sawyer & Nelson, P.A., 176 A.3d 729 (Me. 2017). 
The Maine Rules of Professional Conduct do not explicitly address the issue presented by this 
appeal: if, and to what extent, an attorney or law firm must inform a prospective client about the 
effect of a provision that prospectively requires the client to submit malpractice claims against 
that attorney or firm to arbitration.  However, interpretations of the Rules by both the Maine 
Professional Ethics Commission and the ABA, expressed in advisory opinions, indicate that for 
such a provision to comply with the Rules, the client must be fully informed of its scope and 
effect. 
Id. at 735. 
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prospectively requires the client to submit malpractice claims against those 
attorneys to arbitration.”157  The opinion of the court used the phrase 
“informed consent” seventeen times, which, in light of the court’s holding, 
clearly suggests the importance of informed consent principles in the law of 
lawyering. 
While the Snow court noted that a comment in the Maine Rules of 
Professional Conduct, similar to language in the Model Rules,158 “provides 
that an attorney may permissibly enter into an agreement to prospectively 
submit malpractice claims to arbitration if ‘the client is fully informed of the 
scope and effect of the agreement[,]’”159 it rested its decision on a broader 
body of law.  It stated that conditioning the enforceability of an arbitration 
provision on informed consent “is based on the long-standing principle that 
attorneys owe a fiduciary duty of ‘undivided loyalty’ to their clients, a duty that is 
derived from the common law and that ‘predate[s] and exist[s] despite 
independent, codified ethical standards.’”160  The court added: 
[T]his obligation is rooted in principles unrelated to arbitration in particular 
and applies to situations that go beyond arbitration: namely, that as a general 
matter, an attorney—who stands as a fiduciary to his client—should fully 
inform that client as to the scope and effect of her decision to waive significant 
rights.161 
Other courts have reached different results on similar facts.162  For 
example, in Innovative Images, LLC v. Summerville,163 the Supreme Court of 
Georgia upheld the enforceability of a provision requiring arbitration of 
legal malpractice claims “without deciding whether GRPC [Georgia Rules 
 
157. Id. at 737. 
158. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 cmt. 17 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (stating a 
lawyer and client may be able to “enter[] into an agreement . . . to arbitrate legal malpractice claims, 
provided such agreements are enforceable and the client is fully informed of the scope and effect of 
the agreement”). 
159. Snow, 176 A.3d at 736 (quoting ME. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 cmt. 14). 
160. Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Sargent v. Buckley, 697 A.2d 1272, 
1275 (Me. 1997)).   
161. Id. at 739. 
162. See, e.g., Andrew Grossman, Venerable Grp. v. McAfee & Taft, No. CIV-10-853-M, 
2011 WL 463035, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 4, 2011) (“Although plaintiffs allege that the Engagement 
Agreement lacked informed consent, the Court finds that plaintiffs have cited no legitimate authority 
to support the contention that arbitration [of a legal malpractice claim] can be avoided on these 
grounds.”). 
163. Innovative Images, LLC v. Summerville, 848 S.E.2d 75 (Ga. 2020). 
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of Professional Conduct] Rule 1.4 (b) prohibits attorneys from entering into 
agreements requiring arbitration of legal malpractice claims without their 
prospective clients’ informed consent.”164 
2. Bad Business Advice 
Estate of West by West v. Domina Law Group165 was a legal malpractice 
lawsuit alleging a claim of negligence.  The action arose out of the 
defendants’ “allegedly incomplete or incorrect legal advice to Doug West 
(West) regarding his options to resolve his corporation’s deadlock, 
specifically the possible consequences of West’s decision to request that an 
Iowa state court dissolve his corporation.”166  In the malpractice action, 
West’s estate argued: 
Defendants had a duty to fully inform West of all relevant aspects of filing for 
dissolution, including that Finken could elect to purchase West’s shares and 
that Finken’s [e]lection prevented West from withdrawing his petition for 
dissolution, accepting his brother’s alleged offer to buy WMA, or 
retiring/withdrawing from WMA.  The Estate asserts that Defendants 
recommended dissolution, but never informed West that Finken’s election 
would foreclose his Buy-Sell Agreement options before West filed for 
dissolution.  The Estate also asserts that Defendants misinformed West about 
his options.  The Estate asserts that Defendants’ actions and communications 
with West before, during, and after the valuation proceedings indicate that 
they did not fully understand the consequences of dissolution.167 
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa 
allowed the negligence claim to go forward because the evidence was in 
dispute.  There was no discussion of any provisions in the Model Rules or 
the Iowa ethics code, but the court clearly recognized that the case was 
alleging negligence liability based on lack of informed consent because when 
it addressed the issue of causation, it wrote: 
To prove this element, the Estate must show that a reasonable person would 
have taken an alternative path towards ending his business arrangement with 
Finken, if Defendants had fully informed him of the consequences of 
 
164. Id. at 79, 84. 
165. Est. of West by West v. Domina L. Grp., No. 1:16-cv-30-HCA, 2018 WL 3454904 (S.D. 
Iowa May 1, 2018). 
166. Id. at *1. 
167. Id. at *7. 
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dissolution.  The parties, along with the Court, agree that the informed 
consent standard is an objective one.168 
In a footnote, the court added:   
The Iowa Supreme Court uses an objective causation standard when it 
analyzes informed consent in a medical context.  See Pauscher v. Iowa Methodist 
Med. Ctr., 408 N.W.2d 355, 360 (Iowa 1987).  The Court finds that, in the 
context of an informed consent legal malpractice case, an objective standard 
is appropriate as well.169 
3. Bad Litigation Advice 
In Hermansen v. Riebandt,170 the plaintiffs brought a legal malpractice 
action against attorneys (Riebandt, DeWald, and Ottenheimer) and their law 
firms, alleging that the “defendants failed to properly inform [the clients] of 
the risks of litigating the propriety of a mortgage lien on their 
residence . . . .”171  The Illinois Appellate Court held that genuine issues of 
fact precluded summary judgment for the defendants.  Discussing the 
plaintiffs’ allegations, the court wrote: 
The count against Riebandt alleged that he was negligent in . . . (3) failing to 
obtain plaintiffs’ informed consent prior to signing the Fidelity indemnity 
agreement, which resulted in the entirety of the net proceeds from the sale of 
their personal residence being held in escrow; (4) failing to inform plaintiffs 
of the risks of proceeding to litigation against Bank of America, including the 
rejection of multiple settlement offers . . . .  The count against DeWald 
contained similar allegations.  The count against Ottenheimer contained 
similar allegations as to Ottenheimer’s failure to inform plaintiffs of the risks 
of pursuing litigation against Bank of America and also alleged that 
Ottenheimer negligently advised plaintiffs as to the effect of the bankruptcy 
on their obligations to Bank of America.172 
Addressing the facts of the case, the court further explained: 
 
168. Id. at *10. 
169. Id. at *10 n.11. 
170. Hermansen v. Riebandt, No. 1-19-1735, 2020 IL App (1st) 191735 (Nov. 25, 2020). 
171. Id. ¶ 1. 
172. Id. ¶ 27. 
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[P]laintiffs have provided the testimony of an expert who has opined that it 
was not reasonable for defendants to fail to obtain plaintiffs’ informed 
consent in the instant litigation.  Specifically, Robinson identified a number of 
instances during their representation when defendants failed to disclose 
information to plaintiffs that was necessary to enable them to make informed 
decisions.  First, in 2011, when Riebandt discovered that the mortgage lien 
had been discovered but failed to inform plaintiffs or to counsel them as to 
the risk of inaction.  Second, when defendants began their attempts to remove 
the lien and Riebandt and DeWald failed to inform plaintiffs that they had an 
interest in resolving the issue in a way that did not reflect negatively on 
Riebandt.  Third, when Ottenheimer failed to inform plaintiffs that he had 
overlooked the presence of the mortgage lien when handling their bankruptcy.  
Fourth, when Riebandt and DeWald failed to disclose Riebandt’s relationship 
with Fidelity, leading plaintiffs to believe that Riebandt was acting with 
undivided loyalty in signing the indemnity agreement.  Fifth, when defendants 
advised plaintiffs to reject two settlement offers without informing them of 
the risks of loss, their exposure in the event of loss, the limits to their recovery 
if they won, and the length of time it would take to litigate.  Thus, plaintiffs 
have provided evidence that defendants did not exercise a reasonable degree 
of care or skill in representing plaintiffs.  Ottenheimer also presented the 
report of an expert, Flaxman, who opined that Ottenheimer’s conduct in 
addressing the lien did not violate the standard of care.  While we note that 
Flaxman’s report did not address Robinson’s contention that Ottenheimer 
violated the standard of care by failing to inform plaintiffs of the risks of their 
course of conduct, at a minimum, there is a question of fact as to the propriety 
of defendants’ conduct.  In the presence of this question of fact, we cannot 
find that summary judgment on this basis is appropriate.173 
The Hermansen court did not rely upon provisions in the Model Rules or 
state ethics codes that require informed consent.  However, the court clearly 
implied that lack of informed consent is a valid theory on which liability for 
negligence can be proved. 
4. Unauthorized Litigation 
In Tye v. Beausay,174 two sons of a medical malpractice plaintiff brought a 
legal malpractice action against a lawyer (Beausay) who had involved them 
in the medical malpractice case without their knowledge and caused them 
to sign a release of their medical malpractice claims as part of the 
 
173. Id. ¶ 100 (emphasis omitted). 
174. Tye v. Beausay, 156 N.E.3d 331 (Ohio Ct. App. 2020). 
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settlement.175  Upon discovering the true facts, the brothers argued that 
Beausay had failed to obtain informed consent with respect to the initiation 
and prosecution of the litigation, and the signing of the release.176  The 
opinion of the Court of Appeals is rooted in earlier tort decisions in Ohio 
and other states, including an extensive discussion of informed consent in 
medical malpractice law and legal malpractice law.  There is no reference to 
informed consent requirements in the Model Rules or state variations 
thereof.  With respect to proving causation in an informed consent case, the 
court wrote: 
The question does arise whether an objective standard, with even some 
subjective element, . . . would properly apply in legal malpractice cases that 
involve informed consent. 
We have not found Ohio authority extending an objective, “reasonable 
person” standard to legal malpractice cases where the contention is that the 
lawyer took actions without properly informing a client.  The authority outside 
Ohio is also virtually non-existent.177 
The court concluded: 
Having reviewed these authorities, or rather, the lack of authority, we cannot 
find a basis for incorporating the medical malpractice standards for informed 
consent, which would allow consideration of what a reasonable person would 
do, as opposed to what Matthew Tye said he would do.  There may be 
arguments for using an objective standard as well as some subjective analysis, 
but we have not been able to find such authority.178 
Applying a subjective causation standard, the court barred one brother’s 
informed consent claim because he admitted that even if he had been 
properly informed, he would still have signed a release of his claims in the 
underlying medical malpractice action.179  However, with respect to the 
other brother, who was intellectually disabled, there was a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether Beausay’s actions were the proximate cause of 
any harm.180 
 
175. Id. at 335–36. 
176. Id. at 336. 
177. Id. at 344. 
178. Id. at 347. 
179. Id. at 348. 
180. Id.  
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In Walsh v. Cunniff,181 the plaintiffs filed a legal malpractice action against 
the defendant alleging he “was negligent in the underlying litigation” for 
allowing certain viable defendants “to be dismissed for want of prosecution 
in 2010 without the informed consent of plaintiffs . . . .”182  The Illinois 
Appellate Court found the claim was barred by the statute of limitations.183  
However, absent such a barrier, it is reasonable to argue that this is precisely 
the type of information a client has a right to know, and which a lawyer 
should be obliged to disclose without a request. 
C. Cases Not Using the Term “Informed Consent” Nor Citing Ethics Rules 
There are some cases that neither use the term “informed consent” nor 
cite the Model Rules or state variations, that nevertheless recognize the 
principles on which the doctrine of informed consent is based.184  For 
example, in Bowman v. Gruel Mills Nims & Pylman, LLP,185 a malpractice 
action, a federal court in Michigan concluded that regardless of whether a 
lawyer’s decision not to press ERISA claims in a retirement benefit dispute 
was a protected exercise of professional discretion, that choice, as a key 
strategic decision, needed to be discussed with the client.186 
Similarly, in Sierra Fria Corp. v. Donald J. Evans, P.C.,187 former clients 
brought a legal malpractice action based on negligence, arguing that their 
lawyers had failed to advise them of the dangers of proceeding with the 
purchase of two hotels in Aruba without a property survey.188  After the 
deal closed, the clients learned that “assets having an appraised value in 
excess of $4,000,000—tennis courts, parking spaces, and an administrative 
building housing the hotels’ laundry facilities—lay on land belonging to” an 
adjacent business.189 
 
181. Walsh v. Cunniff, No. 1-16-1046, 2017 IL App (1st) 161046-U (June 16, 2017). 
182. Id. ¶ 7. 
183. Id. ¶ 21. 
184. Cf. Thomas & Wong, Gen. Contractor, Inc. v. Wallace, No. 1 CA-CV 08-0634, 
2010 WL 475690, at *9 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2010) (finding that a lawyer acting as an agent had “a 
duty to use reasonable efforts to provide the company with material information she was aware of or 
should have been aware of that could affect Thomas & Wong’s decision to enter into the loan 
transaction”). 
185. Bowman v. Gruel Mills Nims & Pylman, LLP, No. 5:06-CV-87, 2007 WL 1203580 (W.D. 
Mich. Apr. 24, 2007). 
186. Id. at *2, 5–6. 
187. Sierra Fria Corp. v. Donald J. Evans, P.C., 127 F.3d 175 (1st Cir. 1997). 
188. Id. at 179. 
189. Id.  
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Addressing the lawyers’ disclosure obligations, the First Circuit wrote: 
[W]hen a client seeks advice from an attorney, the attorney owes the client “a 
duty of full and fair disclosure of facts material to the client’s interests.”  This 
means that the attorney must advise the client of any significant legal risks 
involved in a contemplated transaction, and must do so in terms sufficiently 
plain to permit the client to assess both the risks and their potential impact on 
his situation.  Consequently, in a legal malpractice action that implicates an 
attorney’s performance of his counseling function, the trier of fact must 
determine whether the attorney’s advice permitted the client adequately to 
weigh the risks involved in a given course of action.190 
The court affirmed a judgment for the lawyers because there was ample 
evidence to support the trial court’s findings that the dangers of proceeding 
with the purchase had been repeatedly disclosed.191  The First Circuit wrote:  
Massachusetts law requires an attorney performing a counseling function to 
advise the client in a manner that permits the latter intelligently to assess the 
risks of taking (or declining to take) a particular action.  But lawyers—even 
high-priced lawyers—ordinarily are not guarantors of favorable results.  It is 
neither fair, practical, nor legally appropriate to benchmark an attorney against 
a standard of prescience.  Thus, lawyers are not obliged to relate in exquisite 
detail every fact or circumstance that might conceivably have a bearing on the 
client’s business decision or to anticipate remote risks.  By the same token, 
lawyers are not expected to persist relentlessly when clients—especially clients 
who are sophisticated businessmen—choose to go forward after being 
suitably informed of looming risks.  See Conklin v. Hannoch Weisman, 145 N.J. 
395, 678 A.2d 1060, 1069 (1996) (stating that “an attorney has no obligation 
‘to lie down in front of a speeding train’ to prevent a bad deal”).192 
V.    SPECIAL ISSUES 
This section discusses four special issues of recurring importance: (1) the 
nature of lawyers’ disclosure obligations to clients; (2) the ability of lawyers 
and clients to define the scope of the representation; (3) the role of expert 
testimony; and (4) the proof of factual causation. 
 
190. Id. at 179–80 (citation omitted). 
191. Id. at 184. 
192. Id. at 182 (citation omitted). 
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A. The Nature of Lawyers’ Disclosure Obligations to Clients 
In many representations, the operative law and the relevant facts are 
complex, and there is a need for a lawyer and client to agree on a course of 
action.  In these types of cases, it is important for a lawyer to be able to 
exercise some degree of discretion and judgment in advising a client.  In a 
particular case, a great deal of information related to risks and alternatives 
may qualify as “material,” yet relaying every piece of information with equal 
emphasis would be a dubious way for a lawyer to attempt to fulfil disclosure 
obligations to the client.   
Some judicial opinions discussing disclosure obligations to clients 
expansively state that lawyers owe clients a duty of “absolute and perfect 
candor.”193  However, as I have stated on other occasions, that “cannot 
possibly be an accurate statement of an attorney’s obligations” in every 
situation: 
[S]uch a standard would be impractical.  A duty of candor that is “absolute 
and perfect” would require a lawyer to convey to a client every piece of data 
coming into the lawyer’s possession, no matter how duplicative, arcane, 
unreliable, or insignificant.  Little would be gained by imposing such an 
exacting obligation, and much would be lost in terms of efficiency and 
expense.  If lawyers were required to be mere relayers of information and not 
permitted to exercise judgment in terms of what facts to convey to clients, the 
legal system would run far less smoothly than it does today. . . .  [T]he essence 
of good lawyering is the exercise of judgment.  Arguably, evaluative discretion 
must extend just as readily to communicating with clients, as to investigating 




193. Recent cases include: Fitch v. L. Off. of Patricia Kane, No. NNHCV176068687, 
2020 WL 3429142, at *22 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 18, 2020) (concerning duties arising out of a legal 
relationship); Guo Wengui v. Clark Hill, PLC, 440 F. Supp. 3d 30, 36 (D.D.C. 2020) (describing the 
foundations of a fiduciary relationship); Flores v. Gonzalez & Assocs. L. Firm, No. 13-15-00205-CV, 
2016 WL 5845922, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Oct. 6, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) 
(explaining appellants argument that the lack of such candor constituted breach of fiduciary duty); see 
also Johnson, supra note 26, 753–70 (discussing cases from Texas, Oklahoma, and the District of 
Columbia). 
194. Johnson, supra note 26, at 739 (footnotes omitted). 
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Further: 
[T]he duty of “absolute and perfect candor” applies most forcefully in 
instances where the interests of the attorney and client are adverse, as in the 
case of a business transaction between them. 
. . . .  
[In addition,] a relatively small number of areas [in] the legal profession 
[have] developed [ethics] rules that call for . . . disclosure of [particular] 
information.  For example, in seeking to obtain an effective client waiver of a 
conflict of interest, the lawyer must disclose the existence, nature, 
implications, and possible adverse consequences of the conflict.  In dealing 
with client property, a lawyer must promptly notify a client of its receipt.  In 
entering into an agreement for legal services with a new client, the lawyer must 
disclose the basis or rate of the fee.  And upon receiving a settlement offer, a 
lawyer ordinarily must communicate the offer to the client promptly. . . .  
[W]here specific rules of conduct have crystalized, attorneys are [sometimes] 
faced with demanding disclosure obligations. 
However, outside of these limited contexts, the disclosure obligations of 
attorneys are more properly described by the rule of negligence . . . .195 
Some scholars anchor the disclosure obligations that are at the heart of 
the informed consent doctrine in the law of fiduciary duty, rather than the 
negligence principles of tort law.  Thus, legal malpractice expert Ronald E. 
Mallen writes: 
A corollary of the fiduciary obligations of undivided loyalty and confidentiality 
is the attorney’s responsibility to promptly advise the client of any important 
information that may impinge on those obligations.  This means that there 
must be complete disclosure of all information that may bear on the quality 
of the attorney’s representation.  The disclosure must include not only all 
material facts but also should include an explanation of their legal 
significance.196 
However, even if the analysis is framed in terms of breach of fiduciary 
duty (disloyalty) rather than negligence (lack of care), the necessity of 
 
195. Id. at 771, 774–75 (footnotes omitted). 
196. 2 RONALD E. MALLEN, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 15:26 (2021 ed.) (footnotes omitted). 
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proving that the breach of fiduciary duty was culpable inevitably returns to 
the touchstone of negligence:197 
Breach of fiduciary duty is not a strict liability tort.  A plaintiff alleging 
fiduciary breach must show that the defendant-lawyer acted negligently, 
recklessly, or intentionally in violating fiduciary principles.  Absent proof of 
culpability, there is no liability for breach of fiduciary duty.198 
Thus, the Restatement says “[a] lawyer who has acted with reasonable care 
is not liable in damages for breach of fiduciary duty.”199 
Consequently, as the foregoing discussion suggests, in deciding whether 
a lawyer has acted in accordance with the informed consent disclosure 
obligations imposed by the law of negligence and the law of fiduciary duty, 
it is necessary to consider whether the lawyer’s obligations are governed 
(1) by the usual obligation of reasonable care,200 (2) heightened standards 
articulated by ethics rules or other law that sometimes require specific 
disclosures (in addition to the exercise of reasonable care), or (3) an 
obligation of “absolute and perfect candor” because the interests of the 
lawyer and the client are adverse. 
B. The Scope of the Representation 
Within broad bounds, a lawyer and a client are free to define the scope of 
the representation and, consequently, the duties the lawyer owes to the 
client.  Thus, it has long been recognized that, unless unreasonable on the 
 
197. See Friedman v. Kahn, No. 1-12-0881, 2013 IL App (1st) 120881-U, ¶ 54 (Ill. App. Ct. 
Dec. 27, 2013) (“[I]t is not true that whenever a lawyer fails to inform his client of a foreseeable risk, 
the lawyer is automatically negligent.  Rather, the question is whether a reasonable divorce attorney 
would have informed his client of such a risk in similar circumstances.”). 
198. Fortney & Johnson, Legal Malpractice, supra note 1, § 5-3.1(d), at 791. 
199. Johnson, supra note 26, at 776 (alteration in original) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
THE L. GOVERNING LAWS. § 49 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 2000)). 
200. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE L. GOVERNING LAWS. § 20 (AM. L. INST. 2000).  
Section 20 provides: 
(1) A lawyer must keep a client reasonably informed about the matter and must consult with a client 
to a reasonable extent concerning decisions to be made by the lawyer under §§ 21–23. 
(2) A lawyer must promptly comply with a client’s reasonable requests for information. 
(3) A lawyer must notify a client of decisions to be made by the client under §§ 21–23 and must 
explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions 
regarding the representation. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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facts,201 a lawyer and a client may narrow the lawyer’s disclosure obligations 
to the client.202  This is still the rule.  Section 20 of the Restatement (Third) of 
the Law Governing Lawyers, in discussing the communication duties of lawyers 
to clients, states: “To the extent that the parties have not otherwise agreed, a standard 
of reasonableness under all the circumstances determines the appropriate 
measure of consultation.”203  In addition, Section 19 of the Restatement 
expressly provides that: “(1) Subject to other requirements stated in this 
Restatement, a client and lawyer may agree to limit a duty that a lawyer 
would otherwise owe to the client if: (a) the client is adequately informed 
and consents; and (b) the terms of the limitation are reasonable in the 
circumstances.”204  If a sophisticated and experienced business client tells 
a lawyer that he does not want any advice about the wisdom of a proposed 
merger, and that the lawyer’s job is simply to draw up the documents, the 
lawyer can follow those directions without fear of being sued for failure to 
disclose risks related to the merger, provided that it is reasonable to believe 
that the client fully understood the risks. 
C. The Role of Expert Testimony 
Regardless of whether a legal malpractice case based on negligent 
nondisclosure does or does not use the term “informed consent,” the 
analysis of whether there was a breach of duty should be governed by the 
usual rules,205 which normally require the production of expert 
 
201. See Fortney & Johnson, Legal Malpractice, supra note 1, § 5-2.1(b)(3) at 738 (discussing 
“[u]nreasonable [l]imits on the [s]cope of [r]epresentation”). 
202. In 1958, the Restatement (Second) of Agency stated: “The existence and extent of the duties of 
the agent to the principal are determined by the terms of the agreement between the parties, interpreted 
in light of the circumstances under which it is made . . . .”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 
§ 376 (AM. L. INST. 1958).  Explaining that provision, the commentary to Section 376 opined: 
Thus, the duties . . . of care, . . . of obedience, and . . . of loyalty . . . [as set forth in various 
provisions of the Restatement] are inferences drawn from the conduct of the parties in light of 
common experience and what reasonable men regard as fair.  The rules stated in such Sections 
are the rules applicable to the normal case, in which the parties have not made a different 
agreement. . . .  [T]he parties can make what agreements they please, . . . with [limited] 
exceptions . . . . 
Id. § 376 cmt. a. 
203. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE L. GOVERNING LAWS. § 20 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2000) 
(emphasis added). 
204. Id. § 19. 
205. See Scott v. Chuhak & Tecson, P.C., No. 09 C 6858, 2011 WL 4462915, at *4 (N.D. Ill. 
Sept. 26, 2011) (“[T]he standard of care against which the attorney defendant’s conduct will be 
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testimony.206  The expert ordinarily should opine on (1) whether, in the 
circumstances, the nondisclosed matter was material, (2) whether the 
exercise of due care required its disclosure,207 (3) whether sufficient 
information was clearly disclosed to permit a client to make an informed 
decision,208 and, depending on the jurisdiction, (4) whether nondisclosure 
caused damages.209  Absent the benefit of expert testimony, a jury should 
not be permitted to decide these matters, unless the answers would be 
obvious even to a layperson.  That will not often be the case.  As a federal 
court in California remarked: “The intricacies of the doctrine of informed 
consent . . . are not . . . ‘readily apparent’ to laymen.”210 
 
measured must generally be established through expert testimony.” (quoting Barth v. Reagan, 
564 N.E.2d 1196, 1200 (Ill. 1990))). 
206. Cf. Note, Restructuring Informed Consent: Legal Therapy for the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 
79 YALE L.J. 1533, 1557 (1970) (“Only if there is a substantial conflict among professionals will the 
question of the proper standard of conduct get resolved by the jury . . . .”). 
207. See Vincent R. Johnson, Legal Malpractice in International Business Transactions, 44 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 325, 345–51 (2015) (discussing tort liability for failure to disclose material risks related to 
international business transactions and offering illustrations). 
208. With respect to conflicts of interest, the Restatement explains:  
Informed consent requires that each affected client be aware of the material respects in which the 
representation could have adverse effects on the interests of that client.  The information required 
depends on the nature of the conflict and the nature of the risks of the conflicted representation.  
The client must be aware of information reasonably adequate to make an informed decision. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE L. GOVERNING LAWS. § 122 cmt. c(i) (AM. L. INST. 2000). 
209. Whether expert testimony on causation of damages is appropriate in a legal malpractice 
case is a matter of great dispute.  A review of American law shows that it is sometimes permitted.   
See id. § 52 cmt. g (“[A] plaintiff alleging [malpractice] ordinarily must introduce expert testimony 
concerning the care reasonably required in the circumstances of the case and the lawyer’s failure to 
exercise such care.”).  Other times it is required.  See Primis Corp. v. Milledge, No. 14-08-00753-CV, 
2010 WL 2103936, at *1, *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 27, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) 
(determining expert testimony is necessary because the “causal link between the attorney’s negligence 
and the alleged damages is beyond the trier of fact’s common understanding”).  While other times it is 
prohibited entirely.  See Leibel v. Johnson, 728 S.E.2d 554, 556 (Ga. 2012) (holding expert testimony is 
not appropriate to prove proximate causation in a legal malpractice claim, but rather this would be a 
task for the jury); see also Conklin v. Hannoch Weisman, 678 A.2d 1060, 1069 (N.J. 1996) (“Without 
any insight into the make-up and needs of the legal malpractice plaintiff, expert testimony regarding 
what a reasonably prudent client would have done under similar circumstances in weighing the risks 
and complications of complex commercial business transactions appears of dubious value to the trier 
of fact.”). 
210. Lewellen v. Phillips, No. C062277, 2010 WL 4851362, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2010). 
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D. Proof of Factual Causation 
With respect to whether the nondisclosure of a material fact caused harm, 
there are a range of choices for framing the inquiry into factual causation.  
The jury could be asked whether, but for the nondisclosure, (1) the plaintiff 
would not have consented;211 (2) a reasonable person would not have 
consented;212 (3) a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would not have 
consented; or (4) both the plaintiff and a reasonable person would not have 
consented.  Reasonable minds can differ as to which of these inquiries 
would be the most reliable guide to determining whether the nondisclosure 
did, in fact, cause harm.213   
However, it is important to remember that the factual causation issue 
arises in two types of nondisclosure cases—cases which use the term 
“informed consent” and cases which do not.  In the latter group of cases—
ordinary negligence claims—it is well established that the assessment of 
factual causation is essentially a subjective inquiry.  The question is whether 
but for the nondisclosure this particular plaintiff would have chosen a 
different course and would not have suffered harm.   
If that is true, there is no reason to engraft a reasonable-person 
requirement onto the factual causation inquiry in the former group of cases 
merely because the cases use the terminology of informed consent.  Thus, 
the question should be whether the particular plaintiff would not have 
consented.  There is little reason to think that this subjective standard for 
assessing factual causation will risk the erroneous imposition of liability on 
 
211. See Conklin, 678 A.2d at 1070 (discussing “reasons for rejecting the subjective standard of 
informed consent in the medical malpractice context” and rejecting the subjective standard in the legal 
malpractice context). 
212. See id. at 1069 (“The objective theory of informed consent, under which the jury would be 
asked to consider whether a reasonably prudent client would have entered into a business transaction 
if adequately informed of its attendant risks, fails to reflect the many highly subjective, personal, 
financial and strategic concerns that underlay most legal decisions and that are not present in the 
majority of medical decisions.  A majority of medical patients are sick and consult a doctor for a single 
purpose—to get well.  The patients usually bring little or no personal knowledge to the evaluation of 
the risks associated with their recovery.”). 
213. See id. at 1073 (“[W]e find that the objective and subjective tests for informed consent, 
borrowed from the medical malpractice context, are unsuited for legal malpractice cases in which 
inadequate or inaccurate advice is alleged as a concurrent cause of harm.  Rather, we hold that usual 
principles of negligence apply, including an analysis of foreseeability.  We hold, however, that the 
traditional jury charge on proximate cause as a continuous sequence is inapt for legal malpractice cases 
in which there are concurrent independent causes of harm and that a jury in such cases must be 
instructed to determine whether the negligence was a substantial factor in bringing about the ultimate 
harm.”). 
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the defendant-lawyer.  The plaintiff must still adduce expert testimony that 
the nondisclosed information was material, that requirements of reasonable 
care necessitated its disclosure, and that adequate information was not 
provided to secure informed consent.  In addition, in assessing whether the 
plaintiff would have chosen a different course, the jury is not obliged to 
accept the plaintiff’s self-interested testimony, but can, and likely will, assess 
the plaintiff’s credibility by taking into account the reasonableness of what 
the plaintiff says.   
Moreover, an objective test for factual causation would be inconsistent 
with the principles of self-determination on which the doctrine of informed 
consent is based.  As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma stated in a medical 
malpractice case involving lack of informed consent: 
To the extent the plaintiff, given an adequate disclosure, would have declined 
the proposed treatment, and a reasonable person in similar circumstances 
would have consented, a patient’s right of self-determination is irrevocably 
lost.  This basic right to know and decide is the reason for the full-disclosure 
rule.  Accordingly, we decline to jeopardize this right by the imposition of the 
“reasonable man” standard.214 
According to practitioners, factual causation often cannot be proved in 
medical malpractice cases because “the patient was suffering a life-
threatening illness or condition for which reasonable people would undergo 
treatment, regardless of the risks involved.”215  Similar obstacles to recovery 
may be expected in legal malpractice cases alleging lack of informed consent.  
If the client had to act and had no good options, it will be hard to prove that 
a different course would have been taken and a better outcome achieved.  
However, in many instances, clients do not have to act or do have options.  
In such cases, it may well be possible to prove that a lawyer’s failure to 
disclose material information caused harm. 
  
 
214. Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 559 (Okla. 1979) (emphasis omitted). 
215. Thomas E. Albro & Thomas M. Hendell, What Practitioners Can Teach Academics About Tort 
Litigation—the Plaintiff’s Perspective in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 13 J. TORT L. 273, 278 (2020) 
(“Consent cases are generally only worth taking when the procedures involved are elective.”).   
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VI.    CONCLUSION 
The informed consent doctrine in legal malpractice law is not a fad or an 
aberration.  Rather, it is the expression of a core value of American legal 
ethics which holds that clients have both a right to decide important matters 
related to their representation and a right to material information that bears 
upon those decisions.  As stated by the American Law Institute in the 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers: 
When a client is to make a decision, a lawyer must bring to the client’s 
attention the need for the decision to be made, unless the client has given 
contrary instructions . . . .  Before a client signs a contract, . . . the lawyer 
ordinarily should explain its provisions. . . .  The lawyer [also] ordinarily must 
explain the pros and cons of reasonably available alternatives.  The 
appropriate detail depends on such factors as the importance of the decision, 
how much advice the client wants, what the client has already learned and 
considered, and the time available for deliberation.216 
A lawyer’s failure to obtain informed consent from a client related to 
important choices during the representation is a breach of the duty of care 
that will support an action for negligence.  If the client proves that but for 
the nondisclosure different choices would have been made and harm would 




216. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE L. GOVERNING LAWS. § 20 cmt. e (AM. L. INST. 2000) 
(citation omitted). 
